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INTRODUCTION
The United States is at war with tax evaders.' A 2008
Congressional Report estimated that the United States loses
close to US$100 billion in tax revenues annually due to offshore
tax evasion.2 Policy makers often blame tax havens for this
"staggering" statistic, pointing to the legal systems of tax haven
countries that provide tax evaders with the means to avoid
detection by US authorities.3 According to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"),
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1. See, e.g., Charles Rettig & Dennis Perez, Tax Tips: The IRS 2011 Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, L.A. LAW., June 2011, at 9, 9 (noting that the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") has been "waging a fierce battle" against taxpayers who fail to
report earnings on their non-US assets); see also Daniel J. Mitchell, In Praise of Tax
Havens, FREEMAN, July-Aug. 2009, at 23, 23 (asserting that President Obama declared a
war on Americans who shelter their money in overseas, low tax jurisdictions).
2. See STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON DIVIDEND TAX
ABUSE: How OFFSHORE ENTITIES DODGE TAXES ON U.S. STOCK DIVIDENDS 1 (Comm.
Print 2008) (deriving the tax gap from studies conducted by a number of tax experts);
see also David Spencer, Cross-Border Taxation and Bretton Woods II (Part 3), J. INT'L TAX'N,
July 2009, at 44, 47 (summarizing the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs' investigatory findings that offshore tax abuse has cost the United
States billions of dollars, and that offshore hedge funds are "frequent participants" in
these abusive tax practices).
3. See STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., REP. ON TAX HAVEN
ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY 1 (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter
HAVEN ABUSE] (noting that financial professionals utilize bank secrecy laws and limited
disclosure requirements to "hide assets and transactions" from US agencies); see also
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEPT. OF TREASURY, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A
REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 35-36 (2007), available at 2007 WL
2295615 (describing Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") efforts to reduce the tax gap by
allocating resources towards identifying taxpayers who engage in offshore activity).
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globalization has opened up new channels for individuals and
businesses to minimize and avoid taxes.4 Tax havens, generally
nations that lower tax liabilities, can take advantage of this
phenomenon by developing tax policies aimed primarily at
attracting "geographically mobile capital."5 The reduction of
non-tax trade barriers, an element of globalization, has further
exacerbated the effect that domestic tax policies can have on
international economies.6 Consequently, tax havens hold nearly
US$1.5 trillion in US assets.7 As the enormous tax gap suggests,
the United States has thus far found itself on the losing side of
this war.8
4. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN
EMERGING ISSUE 14 (1998) [hereinafter HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION], available at
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf (attributing the rise of
exploitative tax practices to the combination of technological innovation and increased
global competition); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the
Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1575-76 (2000) (describing
technological innovations such as electronic transfer of funds as contributing to
international tax competition).
5. See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 14 (describing the new
opportunities that globalization affords tax havens to develop internal policies aimed at
attracting external capital); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 1576 (explaining that,
because capital is much more mobile than labor, countries compete for both portfolio
and direct investment by lowering the taxable income earned by non-residents).
6. See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 14 (finding that the tax
policies of one country are now "more likely" to have a direct consequence on other
economies); see also Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 939,
949 (2000) (arguing that one country's policies directly affect the outcome of another
country's policies, "and vice versa"). For the interplay between non-tax trade barrier
reduction and domestic tax policies, see, for example, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154
(declaring that positive economic effects of globalization could be obtained through
"reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade").
7. See HAVEN ABUSE, supra note 3, at 2 (reporting the current estimation of US
assets held by tax havens); see alsoJohn D. McKinnon, Tax Justice Network: Wealth Held in
Tax Havens Skyrockets, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2012, 5:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2012/07/22/taxjustice-network-wealth-held-in-tax-havens-skyrockets/
(detailing that unreported wealth held in tax havens could be as high as US$32
trillion).
8. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-04 (Jan. 6, 2012) (discussing the tax gap
estimates for tax year 2006, estimating a voluntary compliance rate of 83.1 per cent,
with underreporting of income as the biggest contributing factor to the tax gap); see
also Nicholas Shaxson, The Truth About Tax Havens: Part 2, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 9,
2011, at 22 (arguing that the impression that offshore tax systems have been
dismantled is contrary to what actually happened).
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More recently, the 2008 financial crisis put pressure on
increasingly indebted governments to refocus their attention on
the harmful effects that tax havens and tax evasion have on their
national treasuries. 9 The United States, like many other nations,
relies on personal income and consumption taxes as a major
source of its tax revenues. 10 As a result, the most recent financial
crisis substantially decreased US tax revenues because both
earnings and consumption dropped." Further, the Troubled
Asset Relief Program ("TARP") and other federal government
bailouts created additional spending commitments that further
widened the disparity between government spending and
revenue.12
In response to this revenue shortcoming, and drawing upon
the lessons from the 2008 UBS AG tax evasion scandal, in which
UBS admitted to fraud and conspiracy in exchange for a US$780
million fine, Congress enacted the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act ("FATCA"), as part of the comprehensive
9. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40114, THE OECD INITIATIVE
ON TAX HAVENS 1 (2009) (arguing that governments have been targeting tax havens to
increase revenues because of the financial crisis); see also John Brondolo, Collecting
Taxes During an Economic Crisis: Challenges and Policy Options, IMF STAFF POSITION NOTE
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.), July 14, 2009, paras. 54-57, available at
http://www.inif.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spnO917.pdf (noting that tax
agencies are strengthening their enforcement efforts as a result of the financial crisis,
and that these concerns have intensified with deteriorating national treasuries).
10. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Taxation in a Time of Crisis: Policy Leadership from the
OECD to the G20, 5 Nw. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 19, 21 (2010) (describing the shift towards
taxes on personal income as opposed to capital taxes); see also U.S. GOV'T REVENUE
BREAKDOWN, http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/breakdown (last visited Jan. 24,
2013) (breaking down the sources of US revenues by category).
11. See Christians, supra note 10, at 21 (noting that economic crises directly affect
earnings and therefore consumption levels); see also Jaewoo Lee, Pau Rabanal &
Damiano Sandri, U.S. Consumption After the 2008 Crisis, IMF STAFF POSITION NOTE (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 15, 2010, paras. 7-8, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spnlOO.pdf (reporting a three
percent decline in US household consumption between 2008 and 2009, coupled with a
steep decline in wealth).
12. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211-5241
(2012) [hereinafter EESA] (creating The Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") in
Title I of Pub. L. 110-343); Christians, supra note 11, at 21 (explaining that
governments have been forced to meet the additional revenue needs largely through
borrowing); see generally Brent Horton & Jack Vrablik, The Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP): Uses and Abuses, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP., Aug. 2010, at 24 (2010)
(describing the number of ways in which the TARP funds have been used).
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Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment ("HIRE") Act. 13
President Obama signed the bill into law on March 18, 2010, as
a potentially forceful solution to the type of offshore tax evasion
brought to light by the UBS scandal. 14 FATCA's stated purpose is
to detect and deter offshore tax evasion by requiring all Foreign
Financial Institutions ("FFIs"), non-US trusts, and non-US
corporations to identify and annually report information to the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") about their US
accountholders. 15 The overseas entities that do not comply with
FATCA's provisions face a thirty percent withholding tax on all
US-sourced withholdable payments (i.e., certain types of
payments generally fixed or determinable, annual or periodical
("FDAP")) to a non-US person or business entity. 16 As US
Senator Carl Levin pointed out, some financial institutions
might choose to forego all US investments rather than enter
into a FATCA compliance agreement.17 Institutions that do not
forego their US investments, though, will be subject to FATCA's
new, and more complicated, disclosure requirements.18
13. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124
Stat. 71 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA") constitutes Title V of the Hiring Incentives to
Restore Employment ("HIRE") Act, and acts as a revenue-generating offset provision.
26 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1474. See Brian Kindle, FATCA May Identify Tax Cheats, but its Dragnet
for Financial Criminals May Produce an Even Bigger Yield, ASS'N CERTIFIED FIN. CRIME
SPECIALISTS (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.acfcs.org/fatca-may-identify-tax-cheats-but-its-
dragnet-for-financial-criminals-may-produce-an-even-bigger-yield/ (reporting that the
"groundbreaking" UBS settlement inspired the FATCA legislation).
14. See 155 CONG. REC. S10778-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Max Baucus) (exclaiming that FATCA represented a turning point in putting an end to
offshore tax evasion); see also Nick Mathiason, Tax Scandal Leaves Swiss Giant Reeling,
OBSERVER (U.K), June 28, 2008, at 4 (describing how UBS systematically helped
wealthy US clients evade US taxes).
15. See I.R.C. §§ 1471-1474 (2006) for the specific statutory provisions to which
FATCA applies. See also 155 CONG. REC. S10778-01 (announcing that FATCA
strengthens the ability of the United States to detect tax evasion).
16. See I.R.C. § 1441(b) (addressing withholdable payments generally); see
generally David Spencer, The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009, 26 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 28 (2010) (summarizing the provisions of FATCA).
17. See 157 CONG. REC. S4518-01 (daily ed. July 12, 2011) (statement of Sen. Carl
Levin) (maintaining that "U.S. banks have had it with foreign banks using secrecy to
attract U.S. clients"); see also Spencer, supra note 16, at 28 (providing that FATCA
applies to all Foreign Financial Institutions ("FFIs") that derive US-source income).
18. See I.R.C. §§ 1471-1474; see also 157 CONG. REC. S4518-01, (arguing that the
US has a right to enforce its tax laws against those who do business in the United
States).
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Recently the IRS announced that it would modify its
proposed regulations and extend the implementation of FATCA
to January 1, 2014, to "reduce administrative burden." 19
Although this extension was certainly a welcome reprieve,
FATCA raises a number of concerns in its critical purpose of
attempting to enforce US tax laws and solve offshore tax
evasion. 20 According to some financial analysts and
commentators, compliance with FATCA's due diligence
requirements poses an immense administrative burden upon
compliant FFIs.21 This burden could be so great as to potentially
drive future investment away from the United States, which
would then likely fail to generate the revenue anticipated.22
This Comment examines the harmful consequences that
the implementation of FATCA might have, particularly as this
legislation could affect the ability of the United States to induce
tax haven compliance in the future. Tax evasion thrives on
information asymmetry, and the current bilateral and
19. I.R.S. Announcement 2012-42, I.R.B. 2012-47 (Nov. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2012-47-IRB/ar09.html (noting that the IRS received
comments identifying practical concerns about the implementation of FATCA that the
IRS had deemed warranted an extension to decrease administrative burdens); see
Samuel Rubenfeld, Experts Laud Extra Time to Implement FATCA Compliance, WALL ST.J.
(Jan. 22, 2013, 5:42 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2013/01/22/
experts-laud-extra-time-to-implement-fatca-compliance/ (reporting that the IRS gave
FFIs until December 31, 2013, to modify their compliance systems).
20. See 155 CONG. REC. S10778-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Max Baucus) (claiming that FATCA gives the IRS "powerful tools to find US taxpayers
who are hiding their money in offshore accounts"); see also Marie T. Yates et al., Death of
Information-Exchange Agreements? Part 3, J. INT'L TAX'N, Apr. 2011, at 48, 55 (arguing
that FATCA eases the government's burden in prosecuting offshore tax evasion).
21. See Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign Financial
Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions
and Other Foreign Entities, 78 Fed. Reg. 5874 (Jan. 28, 2013) (outlining the final
regulations of FATCA); see also Kindle, supra note 13 (explaining that some FFIs are
taking an "alternative approach" to compliance by simply dropping their US
customers).
22. See Andrew Quinlan, With Final FATCA Rules Released, It's Now or Never, CTR.
FOR FREEDOM & PROSPERITY (Jan. 24, 2013), http://freedomandprosperity.org/2013/
blog/with-final-fatca-rules-released-its-now-or-never/ (arguing that, in addition to
requiring compliant FFIs to divert billions towards compliance, the Act would
ultimately drive investment out of the US economy); see also Lisa Smith, FATCA Costs
May Drive Wealth Managers Out of Business, IEXPATS (July 28, 2012),
http://www.iexpats.com/2012/07/fatca-costs-may-drive-wealth-managers-out-of-
business/ (maintaining that the costs of compliance could put smaller investment firms
out of business).
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multilateral exchange agreements have proven generally
incapable of overcoming this problem. 23 Part I provides
background information on tax havens and the relevant
international agreements that the United States has used to curb
illicit tax practices. Part II explores the conflict created by the
UBS scandal and Congress' legislative reaction to the
overwhelmingly large federal tax gap through the enactment of
FATCA. It further analyzes the effect that FATCA might have on
future tax treaties between the United States and other
countries. Part III concludes by arguing that, because bilateral
treaties incentivize holdouts by non-signatory nations, FATCA
encourages tax arbitrage and capital flight towards these non-
signatory nations. It concludes that the United States can
overcome this holdout incentive through the use of tax flight
bounty sharing treaties that would induce tax haven
participation in international information exchange, increase
taxpayer voluntary compliance, and minimize tax arbitrage.
I. BACKGROUND
Part I examines the role that tax havens have played in
shaping US tax policy because offshore tax evasion is deeply
intertwined with the existence of tax havens. Part L.A describes
the characteristics of a tax haven and how technological
innovation and globalization have heightened the role tax
havens play in the international tax system. Part I.B then
examines the various international agreements entered into by
the United States with respect to enforcing its tax laws. Finally,
Part I.C details the UBS scandal so as to put FATCA's enactment
into a broader perspective.
23. See Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26
BROOK.J. INT'L L. 1641, 1646 (2001) (arguing that the existing international tax system
under bilateral treaties favors "private actors-both multinational companies and
wealthy individuals-who can take advantage of the lack of coordination to minimize
the taxes they pay"); see also Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International
Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAx REV. 555, 607-09 (2007) [hereinafter Rosenzweig,
International Arbitrage] (acknowledging that multinational cooperation could
potentially overcome the problems of tax arbitrage, but that countries have "little
incentive to engage in bilateral or multilateral cooperation, resulting in an equilibrium
of non-cooperation").
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A. Tax Havens and Harmful Tax Competition
There is no single, unambiguous definition of a "tax
haven." 24 In a 1998 report on harmful tax competition ("1998
Report"), however, the OECD developed a number of factors to
identify a tax haven's key features. 25 Among these factors, the
OECD determined that the necessary starting point in
identifying a tax haven was evaluating whether the country
imposes no or nominal taxes, and offers itself, or is generally
known as, a place that non-residents use to evade taxes in their
home countries. 26 If this first inquiry is answered in the
affirmative, three more key factors can be used to confirm the
existence of a tax haven: (a) lack of effective information
exchange; (b) lack of transparency; and (c) lack of substantial
activities.27
24. See TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, IDENTIFYING TAx HAVENS AND OFFSHORE
FINANCIAL CENTRES 7 (2007), available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/
Identifying Tax Havens Jul_07.pdf (noting that while no single definition exists, some
criteria appear in more than one definition); Michael Littlewood, Tax Competition:
Harmful to Whom?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411, 421 (2004) (explaining that the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") did not attempt
to define the "tax havens" it sought to eliminate).
25. See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 19 (reporting that the
OECD focused on identifying factors that enabled havens to attract mobile, financial
activities); see also Littlewood, supra note 24, at 422 (clarifying that, despite the OECD's
lack of a proposed definition, the OECD devoted substantial portions of the 1998
Report to answer the question of how one might be recognized).
26. See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 22 (maintaining that tax
havens offer ways to minimize taxes); see also Thuronyi, supra note 23, at 1647
(explaining that many countries intentionally create favorable tax regimes in which
corporations take advantage of tax disparities to minimize their own tax burdens).
27. See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 22-24 (explaining that non-
transparent administrative practices facilitate tax evasion because external nations
often cannot access the information); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
THE OECD'S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAx PRACTICES: THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT 10
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 PROGRESS REPORT], available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
harmful/2664438.pdf (acknowledging that determination of the fourth factor would
be difficult, and interpreting the lack of substantial local activities requirement to mean
instead that the inquirer should look to see if there are factors that discourage
substantial domestic activities). More recently, however, and due to concerns expressed
by member countries and tax havens as to its application, the OECD's Committee on
Fiscal Affairs downgraded the significance of this fourth criterion. See id. at 9-10
(noting that, in light of discussions with various jurisdictions, the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs determined that this factor would no longer be used to determine tax haven's
cooperativeness).
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The OECD is an international, intergovernmental
organization comprised of thirty-four member countries
dedicated to the development and analysis of social and
economic policy.2 8 Although the OECD has been tackling the
issue of tax havens since its 1961 formation, it was not until 1996
that the Organization's Ministers called upon the OECD "to
develop measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful
tax competition." 29 In the 1998 Report, the OECD demonstrated
particular interest in studying how regimes that engaged in
harmful competition affected geographically mobile capital,
eroded foreign tax bases, and distorted trade and investment
patterns.30 With the constant acceleration of globalization, the
OECD sought to promote open, multilateral trading systems and
recommend policy adjustments to level the taxation playing field
that it deemed essential to continued global economic growth.31
By many scholarly definitions, the United States is perhaps
the largest tax haven in the world. 32 Non-US citizens are
28. SeeJACKSON, supra note 9, at 1 (providing the background and organization
structure of the OECD); Members and Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND
DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited July 26, 2013)
(enumerating the complete list of member countries); see also What We Do and How,
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/
whatwedoandhow/ (last visited July 26, 2013) (describing the OECD's mission and
objectives).
29. See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 3 (quoting Communique of
the Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level, Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.
(May 21-22, 1996), available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/oecd/oecd96.htm)
(describing the motive behind commissioning the 1998 Report); see alsoJACKSON, supra
note 9, at 5 (outlining the various OECD conventions on tax havens, and noting that
the OECD updated its tax convention to reflect "the liberalization in the capital
markets and the globalization in business activities").
30. See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 8 (identifying the objectives
of the commissioned report so that the OECD could better strengthen and improve
international tax policy in the future); see also Kimberly Carlson, Men Cows Have Wings:
An Analysis of the OECD's Tax Haven Work as it Relates to Globalization, Sovereignty and
Privacy, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 163, 165 (2002) (reporting that the OECD's main
concern was counteracting harmful tax competition with respect to geographically
mobile capital in contrast to, for example, infrastructure investment).
31. See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 9 (enumerating the
proposals that the 1998 Report addresses); see also Carlson, supra note 30, at 173-74
(outlining the proposals set out by the OECD to further its objectives in promoting
"fair" competition).
32. See Daniel J. Mitchell, My Tax havens Are a Blessing, FOREIGN POL'Y (Mar. 17,
2008), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/03/16/why tax havens-are a
blessing (explaining that the United States could be considered "the world's largest tax
haven" and has benefitted tremendously from foreign investment); Bruce Zagaris,
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generally not taxed on, inter alia, capital gains, and thus collect
income without being subject to taxation.33 To create policy
aimed at a tax haven, it is necessary first to determine exactly
which countries are tax havens. 34 Developing a workable
definition of a tax haven is fraught with difficulty because the
definition depends almost entirely upon a baseline with which
to compare it.3 5
Notwithstanding the difficulties in crafting an accurate
definition, the 1998 Report maintains that jurisdictions
intentionally seeking to redirect capital and financial flows away
from other jurisdictions are harmful in that they: (1) distort
financial flows; (2) undermine the integrity and fairness of tax
structures; (3) discourage compliance by all taxpayers; (4)
reshape a country's desired level of taxes and expenditure; (5)
shift the tax burden on less mobile tax bases; and (6) increase
the administrative costs and compliance burdens on tax
authorities.36 According to the OECD, a tax practice that has
substantial spillover effects as to be "poaching other countries'
tax bases" would undoubtedly be regarded as "harmful."37 Many
World Bank Accepts Nonvay's Plan to Target Tax Havens, 23 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
425, 425 (2007) (remarking that despite focus on traditional tax havens, the United
States and United Kingdom are the largest tax havens in the world).
33. See I.R.C. § 871(a) (2012). Non-resident aliens present in the United States
for more than 183 days, however, are taxed like US citizens. See § 7701(b) (3) (A) (ii).
34. See Carlson, supra note 30, at 176 (arguing that by encouraging defensive
measures against countries with no or very low effective tax rates, the OECD is dictating
that these levels are "inappropriate"); see also Mykola Orlov, The Concept of Tax Haven: A
Legal Analysis, 32 INTERTAX 95, 102 (2004) ("The importance of coming up with a
definition arose in the domestic practices of the developed countries which needed to
restrict the abuse of tax haven jurisdictions and practices by their taxpayers.").
35. See J.C. Sharman & Gregory Rawlings, National Tax Blacklists: A Comparative
Analysis, J. INT'L TAX'N, Sept. 2006, at 38, 41 (noting that it is "extremely difficult" to
define a tax haven); see alsoJ. Mukadi Ngoy, The Paradox of Tax Havens: Consequences of
the Subjective Approach, J. INT'L TAX'N, Jan. 2001, at 34, 38 (noting that without one,
unanimous definition, the "quintessential relativity of the concept seems to be its main
feature").
36. See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 16 (enumerating the
potential harmful effects that the internal tax policies of a tax haven may have
externally); see also Carlson, supra note 30, at 174-75 (conveying the OECD's argument
that the continued existence of tax havens has substantial repercussions on other
governments' abilities to finance their social programs due to a shrunken tax base).
37. See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 16 (clarifying that, in the
absence of all of the aforementioned factors, an internal tax policy that poaches money
from other countries must be harmful); see also Thuronyi, supra note 23, at 1647
2013] BUYING FA TCA COMPLIANCE 1777
scholars, however, maintain that tax havens help keep tax rates
down by pressuring politicians in high-tax nations to lower tax
rates.38 The presence of tax havens can, and do, force high-tax
countries like the United States to adopt tax regimes that focus
on favorable in-bound investments, which in turn contributes to
a nation's prosperity. 39
B. International Tax Treaties and Agreements
The United States has confronted some of the problems
that tax havens present through the use of Double Taxation
Agreements ("DTAs"), Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
("MLATs"), and Tax Information Exchange Agreements
("TIEAs"). 40 It has long recognized that it is impossible to fully
enforce domestic tax law without the help of these agreements. 41
According to the IRS, tax treaties serve three main functions: (1)
avoiding the double taxation of income, property or property
transfers; (2) avoiding discriminatory tax treatment of residents
of the signatory nation; and (3) permitting reciprocal
(noting that tax competition to attract external investment undermines the tax bases of
these external nations).
38. See ALoISIo ALMEIDA, FORD SCH. PUB. POLICY, TAx HAVENS: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE OECD WITH POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.2.1 (2004), available at
http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/Publico/estudotributarios/TrabAcademicos/
Textos/AloisioTaxHavens.pdf ("For some people, tax havens help keep rates down
and, therefore, are legitimate tax competitors."); see also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 24-
25 (arguing that tax havens promote good policy and better governance, citing double
taxation treaties as one example of the positive effects of tax competition).
39. See Carlson, supra note 30, at 175 n.50 (pointing to the positive effects that tax
havens may have in disciplining governments against adopting "confiscatory" tax
regimes due to competition); see also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that most
high-tax countries paradoxically have more favorable tax policies for in-bound rather
than internal investment).
40. See United States Income Tax Treaties - A to Z, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/United-States-Income-Tax-
Treaties-A-to-Z (last visited July 27, 2013), for a list of current income tax treaties. See
also Treasuries and TIEAs, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/ tax-policy/ treaties/Pages/ treaties.aspx (last visitedJuly 27, 2013), for recent tax
treaties and Tax Information Exchange Agreements ("TIEAs") that the United States
maintains.
41. See Dennis D. Curtin, Exchange ofInformation Under the United States Income Tax
Treaties, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 35, 35 (1986) (noting that bilateral tax treaties have
grown in importance with the widespread international tax avoidance and evasion,
concomitant with the growth of international trade); see also Treaties in Force, U.S. DEP'T
ST., http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83046.pdf (providing a full list of
bilateral treaties in force as of November 1, 2007, organized by subject).
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administrative assistance in the prevention of tax avoidance and
evasion.42
1. Double Taxation Agreements
DTAs form the "backbone" of today's international tax
regime, and have become "virtually synonymous with
international tax competition." 4 3 The United States, with few
exceptions, taxes its citizens, residents, and domestic
corporations on their worldwide incomes, including incomes
earned in other countries. 44 US citizens who earn income in
another country may also be taxed by the host country, which
leads to potential double taxation. 45 To mitigate this possibility,
the United States either taxes these earnings and then gives a
credit in the amount equal to the foreign tax paid to the source
country, or exempts certain types of income from taxation
entirely.46 The United States currently has about sixty income
tax DTAs in force. 47
2. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties are negotiated and
entered into by the Department ofJustice ("DOJ"), and provide
42. See Rev. Proc. 91-23, 1991-11 I.R.B. 1 (describing the various bilateral income
taxation treaties and their functions); see also JOEL KUNTZ & ROBERT PERONI, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION I C4.18 (2012 ed. 1991) (pointing to the reduction of
double taxation as the "general policy" of income tax treaties).
43. See Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Harmonization and
the Future of the International Tax Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 144 (2009) [hereinafter
Dean, More Cooperation] (explaining that, over time, these bilateral tax treaties secured
a dominant position in international tax regimes); see also KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note
42, 1 C4.01 (proposing that income tax treaties help remove tax barriers that would
otherwise impede international trade and investment).
44. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 901-908, 911 (2012) (listing items excludable from gross
income and exempt from taxation); see also KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 42, 1 C4.18
(explaining, generally, income taxation in the United States as it relates to double
taxation).
45. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 901-908; see also Curtin, supra note 41, at 35 (describing how
the problem of double taxation arises).
46. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 911 (describing allowance of credit and certain
exemptions, respectively); KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 42, 1 C4.18 (explaining how
the US tax credit system works to mitigate double taxation).
47. See KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 42, 1 C4.02 (listing, in table C4-2, all of the
Tax Treaties in Force); U.S. INCOME TAXATION TREATIES CURRENTLY IN FORCE, YALE
UNIV., http://www.yale.edu/ppdev/Guides/ap/3415GD.03.pdf (last revised Oct. 25,
2012) (enumerating the income tax treaties in force).
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cross-jurisdictional assistance in criminal matters. 48 With an
MLAT, signatory countries do not have to seek judicial
intervention to effect the exchange of evidence across
jurisdictions. 49 Rather, each contracting country's designated
Central Authority sends requests to the other nation's Central
Authority when seeking assistance.50 The United States entered
into its first MLAT with Switzerland in 1973.51 Throughout the
past four decades, the number of MLATs signed or negotiated
has steadily grown.5 2
The MLAT between the United States and the Swiss
Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters ("Swiss
MLAT") played a significant role in the DOJ's efforts to resolve
the 2007 UBS banking scandal.53 With the agreement, the two
countries agreed to assist each other in, inter alia, ascertaining
the whereabouts of persons, taking testimony, producing
judicial and other documents relating to evidence, and serving
judicial documents. 54 The Schedule to the treaty lists thirty-five
48. See Cynthia R. Shoss, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, in 2 ASSET PROTECTION:
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TACTICS § 24A:29 (Duncan Osborne &
Elizabeth Morgan Schurig eds., 2013) (examining the purposes and identifying
features of a standard US Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty ("MLAT")); see also L. Song
Richardson, Convicting the Innocent in Transnational Criminal Cases: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis Approach to the Problem, 26 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 62, 81-82 (2008)
(providing a general overview of how MLATs function, their advantages and
disadvantages).
49. See Schoss, supra note 48 (noting that MLATs establish direct channels of
communication "Justice-to-Justice" in order to "expedite . . . the provision of all
categories of assistance"); see also Susan W. Brenner & Lori E. Shaw, Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties, in 1 FEDERAL GRAND JURY § 14:4 (2d ed. 2012) (describing the
request process).
50. See Brenner & Shaw, supra note 49 (noting that the Department of Justice
("DOJ") is designated as the "Central Authority"); see also Ian R. Conner, Note, People's
Divided: The Application of United States Constitutional Protections in International Criminal
Enforcement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 495, 499 (2002) (explaining that the DOJ acts
as the Central Authority for the United States).
51. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 1973, 27
U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss MLAT]; see Conner, supra note 50, at 498 ("The use of
the MLAT has expanded since the United States and Switzerland signed the first MLAT
in 1973 . . . .").
52. See Conner, supra note 50, at 498 (noting an expansion to over forty MLATs
currently in use since the United States first signed an MLAT with Switzerland); see also
Treaties in Force, supra note 41 (listing all MLATs currently in force, current through
2012).
53. See Swiss MLAT, supra note 51; see also Conner, supra note 50, at 498 nn.14-20
(showing similar features of different MLATs).
54. See Swiss MLAT, supra note 51, art. 1.
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offenses for which compulsory measures are available, such as
murder, manslaughter, embezzlement, and forgery.66 Notably,
the treaty does not apply to political offenses, antitrust laws, or
with respect to tax law violations.56
The United States regards both tax fraud and tax evasion as
criminal activity.57 Contrastingly, while tax fraud is a crime
under Swiss law, tax evasion is not.58 Thus, a treaty request under
the Swiss MLAT effectively lifts Swiss bank secrecy laws only in
the case of tax fraud, but not simple tax evasion.59
3. Tax Information Exchange Agreements
The OECD's first model double taxation treaty, drafted in
1963, reflected negotiating nations' principal concern over
double taxation. 60 By 1977, however, the development of
complex international business law increased the need to adopt
information exchange agreements to enforce domestic tax
laws. 61 As such, the OECD recognized the need to revise its
55. See id. sched.
56. See id. art. 2.
57. See26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206 (2012).
58. See Andand Sithian, Comment, "But the Americans Made Me Do It!". How
United States v. UBS Makes the Case for Executive Exhaustion, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 681,
722 (2011) (explaining that tax fraud is a criminal offense involving the filing of
falsified tax documents to mislead tax authorities, whereas tax evasion is a civil
misdemeanor for failing to declare income); Lyssandra Sears, Swiss to Go After Domestic
Tax Cheats, LOCAL (Feb. 24, 2012, 11:30 AM) (quoting Swiss Parliamentarian Jean-
Christophe Schwaab), http://www.thelocal.ch/page/view/2674#.URD VVpFevI ("In
Switzerland, a tax offence is considered a trifle while it is a crime in the United
States.").
59. See Sithian, supra note 58, at 714 (explaining that agencies like the IRS were
often left without recourse when trying to utilize the Swiss MLAT to pursue tax
investigations); Greg Brabec, Note, The Fight for Transparency: International Pressure to
Make Swiss Procedures Less Restrictive, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 231, 253 (2007)
(noting that Swiss secrecy laws would only be relaxed for an MLAT request pursuant to
tax fraud, but not to tax evasion).
60. See JACKSON, supra note 9, at 6-7 (stating that double taxation treaties were
the OECD's first treaties to tackle the problem of tax havens); see also Curtin, supra note
41, at 42 ("In 1963 . . . the principal international concern was the elimination of
double taxation.").
61. See Curtin, supra note 41, at 41 (arguing that the expansion of international
commerce has been a "catalyst for an ever increasing number of income tax treaties");
see generally Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L. REv. 605
(2008) [hereinafter Dean, Incomplete Market] (illustrating the need for standalone
administrative assistance agreements in response to the shortcomings of bilateral
Double Taxation Agreements ("DTAs")).
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model double taxation treaty to provide for exchange of
information. 62 Since then, the steady centripetal forces of
globalization have made TIEAs a fundamental, and necessary,
component of international tax agreements, especially as they
relate to tax evasion. 63
TIEAs are separate from tax treaties, but do not supplant
them. 64 Article 26 of the OECD Model Double Taxation
Convention on Income and Capital ("OECD Model Tax
Convention") generally provides the legal basis for these
bilateral information exchange agreements. 65 Their intended
purpose is to assist each country in the accurate assessment and
collection of taxes, prevent fiscal fraud and evasion, and
improve tax information structure through exchanges of
information.66 The United States has signed more than twenty
bilateral TIEAs, most of them since 2003, and the majority of
which are based on the OECD's 2002 Model TIEA.67
62. See CYM H. LOWELL & JACK P. GOVERNALE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1 9.03:1 (2012 ed. 1998) ("As business expands on a global
scale, it becomes increasingly challenging for tax administrators to gather the
information necessary to determine the proper tax liability of the entities under its
jurisdiction."); see also JACKSON, supra note 9, at 5-6 (explaining that the OECD
updated its 1963 draft to reflect increasingly sophisticated methods of tax evasion, and
new and more complex international transactions).
63. See Curtin, supra note 41, at 43 (stating that the OECD revised its model treaty
in part due to the growing widespread concern over fiscal evasion); see also Dean,
Incomplete Market, supra note 61, at 650-51 (noting that, while not a "silver bullet"
against potential capital flight, TIEAs have had some success).
64. See Tax Information Exchange Agreements, I.R.S. Manual Transmittal, IRM
35.4.5.2.4 (Dec. 21, 2010) [hereinafter IRS TIEA] (explaining the principal differences
between a TIEA and a tax treaty); see also David Spencer, OECD Model is a Major Advance
in Information Exchange (Part 2), J. INT'L TAX'N, Nov. 2002, at 10, 12 (2002) [hereinafter
Spencer, Major Advance] (noting that the OECD's Model TIEA has provisions contrary
to most international tax treaties).
65. SeeJACKSON, supra note 9, at 8 (arguing that Article 26 of the OECD's Model
Tax Convention is "broadly accepted to be the most widely accepted legal basis for
bilateral exchanges of information for tax purposes"); see also Yates et al., supra note 20,
at 50 (explaining that more than 3,000 bilateral treaties are based off of Article 26).
66. See IRS TIEA, supra note 64, para. 1 (describing the usual characteristics of
TIEAs); see also Curtin, supra note 41, at 51 (providing a general overview of exchange
of information agreements in the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on
Income and Capital ("OECD Model Tax Convention"), from which standalone TIEAs
are derived).
67. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS 4-13 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
exchangeofinformation/2082215.pdf (providing an example of the model bilateral
TIEA); see also Hedda Leikvang, Note, Piercing the Veil of Secrecy: Securing Effective
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TJEAs can be severely limited in their practical
application. 68 The agreements generally do not require
requested countries to automatically provide a requesting nation
with tax information, nor furnish any information that it
otherwise would not collect in the normal administration of
their own laws. 69 The effectiveness of a TJEA is predicated upon
the assumption that the requesting state knows the identity of
the tax evader before making the request, and that the
requested state routinely collects the type of information
sought.70 Thus, a "fishing expedition"-using a TJEA to acquire
new, unknown information about a taxpayer that could not have
been determined but for the expedition-is generally not
permissible under US tax treaties.71 For example, under its TJEA
with Switzerland, the United States must first know the full
identity of the accountholder before it can send a treaty
Exchange of Information to Remedy the Harmful Effects of Tax Havens, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 314 (2012) (explaining that most of the TIEAs that the United
States has entered into are based on the OECD's model agreement).
68. See Susan Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty
Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 707 (2012) (detailing that the UBS case forced
Switzerland to renegotiate its TIEA with the United States); see also Lee A. Sheppard,
Will U.S. Hypocrisy on Information Sharing Continue?, 138 TAX NOTES 253, 255 (2013)
(arguing that if a TIEA were effective at all, "tax havens wouldn't sign it").
69. See Yates et al., supra note 20, at 53 (arguing that the lack of automatic
exchange of information is one of the TIEA's biggest limitations); see also Bruce
Zagaris, The Procedural Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many
Sticks and No Carrots, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 331, 341 (2003) [hereinafter Zagaris,
Sticks and Carrots] (explaining that the requested state "need not implement
administrative measures at variance with its own laws" or supply information that it
could not obtain under its own laws).
70. See Morse, supra note 68, at 707 (noting that TIEAs only lift the veil of bank
secrecy if the requesting country "provides a detailed request naming the taxpayer");
see also Zagaris, Sticks and Carrots, supra note 69, at 341 (explaining that requested states
do not need to furnish information they would not otherwise collect).
71 . See JOSE LUIS ESCARIO DiAZ-BERRIO, FUNDACION ALTERNATIVAS
[ALTERNATIVES FOUNDATION], THE FIGHT AGAINST TAx HAVENS AND TAx EVASION:
PROGRESS SINCE THE LONDON G20 SUMMIT AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 38 (2011)
(Spain) (articulating that fishing expeditions "prevent countries making imprecise
requests aimed at detecting irregularities"); Eric M. Victorson, Note, United States v.
UBS AG: Has the United States Successfully Cracked the Vault into Swiss Banking Secrecy?, 19
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 815, 821 (2011) (describing Model TIEAs as preventing
"fishing expeditions" because the first country must demonstrate that it has exhausted
all possible means of acquiring the information sought and that the information is
foreseeably relevant).
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request.7 2 These inherent limitations on the ability to access
accountholder information contributed to Congress's decision
to enact FATCA, which forces FFIs to automatically report
information about its US clients directly to the IRS.73
C. The UBS Scandal
The UBS scandal thrust the issue of offshore tax evasion
into the fore, and helped set the stage for FATCA's enactment.74
In 2007, former UBS banker Bradley Birkenfeld blew the whistle
to the IRS that UBS had been actively helping US clients conceal
their offshore accounts.75 According to Birkenfeld, from at least
2000 to 2007, UBS helped US clients open Swiss accounts with
fraudulently listed foreign beneficial owners, and then
represented to the IRS that these accounts were non-US-owned,
non-US bank accounts outside of the IRS's disclosure
requirements. 76 The bank induced American investment by
72. See DiAZ-BERRIO, supra note 71, at 38 (explaining that under the Model TIEA,
the request must include "very detailed information about the taxpayer" and that many
developing countries may lack the resources necessary to gather the requested
evidence); Morse, supra note 68, at 707 (noting the requirement to provide a detailed
request of the taxpayer in question).
73. See Stafford Smiley, President Obama's Efforts at International Tax Reform, CORP.
TAX'N, Feb. 2011, at 24, 28 (explaining that FATCA puts into a place a new regulatory
structure whereby FFIs "police the identities of their accountholders and assure that
U.S. taxpayers pay the appropriate U.S. taxes"); see also Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Issues Final
FATCA Regs to jump Start International Tax Enforcement, 29 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
42, 43 (2013) ("As the U.S. and foreign governments continue to break down the
barriers between sharing tax information with other law enforcement agencies, FATCA
has critical importance.").
74. See Laura Szarmach, Note, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United
States' Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 409, 410 (2010) (describing the
scandal as "the most high profile illustration of government action against offshore tax
evasion"); Lisa Jucca, Offshore Private Banking Model is Dead After UBS Probe, Experts Say,
REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/
2009/09/01/offshore-private-banking-model-is-dead-experts-say/ (quoting a wealth
manager at Deutsche Bank as saying that the consequences of the UBS scandal were
"dramatic").
75. See Victorson, supra note 71, at 846 (reporting that the whistleblower program
was cited by Birkenfeld as a reason why he came forward to the US authorities); see also
Kevin McCoy, 12 Key Figures Prosecuted in UBS Tax Evasion, USA TODAY (Oct. 13, 2009,
7:39 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2009-10-13-key-figures-
ubs-tax-evasion-caseN.htm (listing Birkenfeld at the top amongst the list of key figures
prosecuted by the DOJ with a description of their crimes).
76. See STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON TAx HAVEN
1784 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1767
assuring its US clients that the IRS would never find out about
these accounts because the bank would not be required to
disclose them, and further, that the accounts would be shielded
by Switzerland's bank secrecy laws.77 On June 19, 2008, Bradley
Birkenfeld pled guilty to conspiring to defraud the IRS by
helping US clients hide US$20 billion in assets, avoiding US
reporting requirements.78
On February 18, 2009, after protracted negotiations that
were leveraged by criminal proceedings initiated in the
Southern District of Florida, the DOJ secured a Deferred
Prosecution Agreement ("DPA") whereby UBS admitted guilt to
fraud and conspiracy, and agreed to provide the United States
with the identities of, and account information for, certain US
customers. 79 The bank further agreed to pay a US$780 million
settlement in exchange for the DOJ's discontinuance of its
criminal prosecution.80
In August 2009, before the federal court made a ruling, the
two countries negotiated an agreement (the "2009 Agreement")
whereby Switzerland agreed to permit UBS to disclose the
names of approximately 4,500 US accountholders in exchange
BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 11 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter REP. ON TAX
HAVEN BANKS] (describing the method by which UBS created allegedly non-disclosable
accounts); see also Szarmach, supra note 74, at 410 (explaining that UBS opened
accounts in the name of "sham entities" to act as the foreign beneficial owner).
77. See REP. ON TAx HAVEN BANKS, supra note 76, at 10 (describing UBS
assurances that bank secrecy laws would prevent US authorities from learning the true
beneficial owner of the accounts); see also Szarmach, supra note 74, at 410-14 (outlining
how UBS generally induced US clients to evade taxes).
78. See REP. ON TAx HAVEN BANKS, supra note 76, at 9 (reporting that Birkenfeld
was charged with personally hiding US$200 million in assets, and evading US$7.2
million in taxes); see also DOJ Press Release No. 08-579 (June 30, 2008), available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-tax-579.html (detailing the
circumstances of Birkenfeld's arrest).
79. See DOJ Press Release No. 09-136 (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://
wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax-136.html (reporting the conditions of
the Deferred Prosecution Agreement ("DPA")); see also Chad Bray, Swiss Bank Pleads
Guilty in Probe, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2013, 3:43 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424127887323874204578219572734283146.html (explaining that the UBS
scandal "set off tensions" between the United States and Switzerland over Switzerland's
bank secrecy laws).
80. See DOJ Press Release No. 09-136, supra note 79 (detailing the circumstances
that led to the DPA); see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement para. 3, United States v.
UBS AG, No. 09-60033-CR-COHN, 2009 WL 611877 (S.D. Fla. 2009) [hereinafter
DPA].
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for withdrawal of the criminal proceedings in the district court.81
Switzerland had previously threatened to seize data from UBS to
ensure that that the bank could not comply with the order, and
insisted that the United States only obtain the information
through a treaty request.8 2
Consistent with this view, the Swiss Federal Administrative
Court ruled that the 2009 Agreement did not validly supersede
Article 26 of the 1996 Double Taxation Agreement between the
United States and the Swiss Confederation ("Swiss DTA"). 83 In
the ruling, the court explained that the 2009 Agreement
provided a "general understanding," but could not be viewed to
override the Swiss DTA's standard of "tax fraud and the like"
found in Article 26. 84 Thus, despite the 2009 Agreement,
domestic banking secrecy laws still prevented the disclosure of
some accountholder information.8 5 The two houses of Swiss
Parliament, however, eventually voted to overrule the January
81. See Agreement on the Request for Information from the Internal Revenue
Service of the United States of America Regarding UBS AG, a Corporation Established
Under the Laws of the Swiss Confederation, U.S.-Switz., art. 3, Aug. 19, 2009, 2009 WL
2524345 [hereinafter 2009 Agreement] (detailing the terms of the settlement
agreement); see also Szarmach, supra note 74, at 432-33 (outlining the criteria used by
Switzerland to identify the 4,500 accountholders ultimately handed over).
82. See Helena Bachmann, U.S. vs. UBS: A Fight Over Secret Swiss Bank Accounts,
TIME (Jul. 15, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/
0,8599,1910389,00.html ("Citing bank-client confidentiality guaranteed in the Swiss
constitution, Switzerland's government has forbidden UBS from complying."); David
Jolly, Swiss Vow to Block UBS from Providing Data to U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/business/global/09ubs.html?dbk (reporting
that the Swiss Government, "vowing to protect its vaunted bank secrecy laws," would
rather seize the data than permit UBS to hand it over).
83. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVGE] [Federal Administrative Court] Jan. 21,
2010, Abteilung I, A-7789/2009, available at www.bundesverwaltungsgericht.ch (search
the court opinions for "A-7789/2009"; find the opinion underJan. 21, 2010).
84. See id.; see also John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, Swiss Administrative Court
Agrees with U.S. Taxpayer that Bank Data Does Not Have to be Provided to IRS Despite
Assistance Agreement Between Switzerland and the U.S., 16 INT'L L. UPDATE 29, 30 (2009) ("
[Under the Swiss-DTA standard,] a fraudulent act must occur which causes the
reduction of tax liability. No Swiss court has decided whether 'mere' evasion of large
tax amounts is fraudulent behavior within the meaning of the [Swiss-DTA].").
85. See Lynnley Browning, Swiss Back Away from Deal to Give Names of Rich UBS
Clients to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at B3 (writing that two Swiss courts had ruled
that disclosure would violate Switzerland's bank secrecy laws); see also Swiss Court Halts
Release of Some UBS Account Holder Data, J. ACCT. (Jan. 25, 2010), http://
wwwjournalofaccountancy.com/Web/20102540.htm (reporting that the Swiss court
held that UBS did not have to hand over the names of confidential data under the 2009
Agreement).
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2010 Federal Administrative Court ruling, and approved the
handover of client data.86
The scandal eventually lead to an agreement that gave Swiss
banks permission to provide US authorities with some
accountholder information, which subsequently caused a
broader investigation of numerous Swiss banks. 87 Recently,
Wegelin & Co., Switzerland's oldest bank, shut its doors
permanently after it pled guilty to criminal conspiracy charges
that it hid more than US$1 billion in assets from the IRS, even
servicing clients lost by UBS after the bank signed the DPA.88
Several other banks, including Credit Suisse, Julius Baer, and
Zfiricher Kantonal Bank are the subjects of DOJ investigations,
which Swiss Parliamentarian Christian Levrat has called a
86. See U.S.-Switzerland Protocol Will Allow Handover of UBS Account Holder
Information, J. ACcT. (Mar. 31, 2010), http://wwwjournalofaccountancy.com/Web/
20102754.htm (explaining that the new protocol would provide a legal basis for
complying with the 2009 Agreement); see also Parliament Approves UBS Agreement, FED.
AUTHORITIES Swiss CONFEDERATION (June 17, 2010), http://www.news.admin.ch/
message/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=33742 (reporting that the Swiss Parliament
approved the agreement by thirty-one votes to nine).
87. See Giles Broom, HSBC, Credit Suisse Sacrifice Employees to U.S., Lawyers Say,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2012, 3:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-15/
hsbc-credit-suisse-sacrifice-staff-to-placate-u-s-lawyers-say.html (noting that while Swiss
companies are usually prohibited from sending evidence to assist non-Swiss legal
proceedings, the Federal Council granted an exemption in April 2012); see also Sean
O'Hare, Switzerland's Oldest Bank Closes After Admitting it Helped 100 Americans Avoid
Paying $1.2billion in Tax, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 4, 2013, 8:02 AM), http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2257119/Wegelin-Co-closes-admitting-helped-100-
Americans-avoid-paying-1-2bn-tax.html (describing that the crackdown on Swiss
banking started with the 2007 investigation of UBS).
88. See Nate Raymond & Lynley Browning, Swiss Bank Wegelin to Close After Guilty
Plea, REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2013, 8:27 AM), http:// www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/04/
us-swissbank-wegelin-idUSBRE90200020130104 (detailing Wegelin's agreement to pay
US$20 million in restitution to the IRS, a civil forfeiture of US$15.8 million, and a
US$22.05 million fine, and would cease to operate as a bank); Marlene Y. Satter, Swiss
Banks Giving Up Employees to IRS, DOJ, THINKADVISOR (Aug. 16, 2012),
http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2012/08/16/swiss-banks-giving-up-employees-to-irs-doj
(reporting that Wegelin had taken over US clients from UBS and continued to
facilitate those clients' evasion of US tax laws after the UBS scandal); DOJ S.D.N.Y.
Press Release No. 13-068 (Mar. 4, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Press Release], available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Marchl3/WegelinSentencingPR.php
(reporting that, on March 4, 2013, Wegelin was formally sentenced in the Southern
District of New York and ordered to pay approximately US$58 million in fines,
restitution, and forfeitures in the first-ever sentence of a non-US bank indicted for
facilitating tax evasion).
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"catastrophe" for the banking industry.89 Demonstrating the
extent to which these DOJ investigations are influencing Swiss
bank behavior, two other Swiss banks, Pictet & Cie and Lombard
Odier, recently changed their centuries-old structures from
unlimited partnerships in favor of corporate partnerships, which
largely shield individuals from personal liability for most
organizational misconduct.90
II. US EFFORTS TO PREVENT TAX ARBITRAGE
Part II analyzes the causes and effects of international tax
arbitrage, and the different ways in which the United States as
sought to prevent this arbitrage to help reduce the federal tax
gap. Part II.A begins by examining the Qualified Intermediary
("QI") program, one of the methods employed by the United
States to reduce tax arbitrages, and how UBS was able to exploit
several of the program's weaknesses. Part II.B.1 describes recent
responses by the US Congress and the US Departments of
Treasury and Justice to combat tax evasion through voluntary
89. See James Schotter, Swiss Banking Reels From Latest Aftershock, FIN. TIMES (Feb,
5, 2013, 10:14 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/96d4al0e-6fa5-11e2-b906-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2LM2XHo5s (describing the allegations by US authorities that
Wegelin's behavior was common in the Swiss banking industry as "alarming" for the
Swiss banks currently under investigation); see also Editorial, The Fight Against Tax
Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A26 (noting the possibility of more indictments to
come after the Wegelin indictment and the DOJ's investigation of multiple Swiss
banks).
90. See Giles Broom, Pictet, Lombard Odier to Drop Centuries-Old Bank Structure,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-05/
pictet-lombard-odier-to-disclose-results-under-new-legal-status.html (noting that the
move might signal an end to Swiss bankers assuming unlimited personal liability); see
also Schotter, supra note 89 (reporting a break from a "banking model that has survived
for more than two centuries, and whose strength and durability lay in reassuring clients
that their interests and those of the partners managing their money were nicely
aligned"). Immediately preceding the publication of this Comment, the United States
and Switzerland signed an agreement that includes fines for banks found to have
facilitated tax evasion in exchange for non-prosecution agreements. The settlement
divides banks into four categories: (1) banks already under criminal investigation by
the DOJ who will accept fines in exchange for non-prosecution; (2) banks that believe
they may have violated US tax law who will accept smaller fines in exchange for
information on their cross-border business; (3) banks that believe that they have not
violated US tax law; and (4) banks whose business is local. It is expected that the deal
could produce more than US$1 billion in penalties, and produce more accountholder
information. See Neil Maclucas, US, Switzerland Sign Agreement to Settle Tax Dispute, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2013, 3:36 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130830-
702365.html.
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disclosures, while Part II.B.2 discuss the enactment and
provisions of FATCA. Part II.C continues by exploring the global
market for tax information as it relates to FATCA-like bilateral
agreements. Specifically, Part II.C.1 examines holdout incentives
in the theoretical game for this tax information, and Part II.C.2
describes tax flight treaties, a proposed solution to this holdout
problem. Finally, Part II.D concludes by assessing the impact
that FATCA has currently had on the global fight against tax
evasion, and discusses the potential costs that FATCA
compliance might require.
A. "Unqualified" Intermediaries: "The Way to Make People Trust-
worthy is to Trust Them'91
The IRS established the QI Program in 2001.92 The UBS
scandal helped expose significant weaknesses in the program, to
which the US Congress subsequently responded through the
implementation of FATCA. 93 It was designed to provide FFIs the
option of more simplified withholding and reporting obligations
if they agreed to become withholding agents for the IRS and
comply with US tax laws. 94 Under the terms of these agreements,
a compliant QI would obtain required tax forms, W-9 or W-
8BEN, from all of its clients, identifying the client as either a US
91. Letter from Ernest Hemingway to Dorothy Connable (Feb. 17, 1953), in
ERNEST HEMINGWAY SELECTED LETTERS 1917-1961, at 805 (Carlos Baker ed., 2003).
Coincidentally, in the latter years of Ernest Hemingway's life, the author developed an
irrational fear that the US government was after him for, amongst other things, tax
evasion. See Roger Jaynes, The Legend, the Man, MILWAUKEE J., Aug. 4, 1980, at 8
("Mentally he was ruled by two obsessions-that someone was trying to kill him, and
that the federal government was after him for tax evasion.").
92. See Rev. Proc. 2000-12, 2000-1 C.B. 387 (providing the final Qualified
Intermediaries ("QI") Agreement and relevant implementation procedures); see also
IRS Signs Qualified Intermediary Agreements, UNCLE FED'S TAX BOARD (Oct. 26, 2000),
http://www.unclefed.com/Tax-News/2000/nrOO-74.html (outlining some of the
benefits that QIs received over non-QIs).
93. See Morse, supra note 68, at 723-24 (noting that FATCA builds on the
development of the QI program); see also Yates et al., supra note 20, at 56 (comparing
the provisions of FATCA as being similar to the QI rules).
94. See REP. ON TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 76, at 22; see also U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-099, QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM PROVIDES
SOME ASSURANCE THAT TAXES ON FOREIGN INVESTORS ARE WITHHELD AND REPORTED,
BUT CAN BE IMPROVED 3 (2007) ("The QI program contains features that give the IRS
some assurance that QIs are more likely to properly withhold and report tax on U.S.
source income sent offshore than other withholding agents.").
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or non-US resident, and report to the IRS information about
taxpayers who self-identified as US citizens. 95
As a QI, UBS was able to conceal account identity
information from the IRS by directing its US clients to refrain
from filling out W-9s.96 Because the clients did not file W-9 forms
with UBS, the bank did not file an informational return, Form-
1099, with the IRS to report taxable income. 97 Under the terms
of these QI agreements, the IRS would not audit a QI if an
approved external auditor conducted an audit on the IRS's
behalf. 98 In a report subsequent to the scandal, the US
Government Accounting Office found that a significant flaw in
the QI agreements was that the agreements were silent as to
whether external auditors were required to follow-up on
indications of fraud or illegal acts by the QI.99
UBS's decade-long practice of fraud and deceit highlighted
many of the problems the United States has faced in employing
a system of worldwide taxation coupled with compliance, the
enforcement of which is largely dependent upon tax treaties
between two nations with disparate tax laws. 100 Switzerland's
initial refusal to permit UBS to release client information
95. See REP. ON TAx HAVEN BANKS, supra note 76, at 23 (explaining the QI
program process to certify US account holders); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e) (5)
(providing client identification requirements).
96. See REP. ON TAx HAVEN BANKS, supra note 76, at 16 (describing the methods
used by UBS to facilitate tax evasion on behalf of their US clients); see Morse, supra
note 68, at 712 (detailing how UBS "deliberately designed workarounds" to avoid its
responsibilities as a QI).
97. See REP. ON TAx HAVEN BANKS, supra note 76, at 9 (reporting that UBS never
filed the appropriate 1099 Forms with the IRS); see also STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAX.,
111TH CONG., TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE
ACCOUNTS AND ENTITIES 34 (Joint Comm. Print 2009) [hereinafter JCX QI] (noting
that QIs were entitled to rely on the certification of non-US status on a Form W-8BEN).
98. See JCX QI, supra note 97, at 22 (describing the audit provisions of the QI
Agreement); see also REP. ON TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 76, at 24 (reporting that
QIs submit to external auditors of their choosing).
99. See REP. ON TAx HAVEN BANKS, supra note 76, at 24 (finding a significant flaw
in the QI agreements whereby the IRS was generally incapable of reviewing the raw
information reviewed by the external auditor); see also JCX QI, supra note 97, at 26
(recommending that the IRS broaden the QI program to require external auditors to
report evidence of fraud or illegal activity).
100. See REP. ON TAx HAVEN BANKS, supra note 76, at 15-17 (finding a number of
flaws in the current system of tax enforcement and basing recommendations on the
lessons learned from the UBS scandal); see also Szarmach, supra note 78, at 422-34
(noting that the UBS case demonstrated that the QI program was practically difficult to
enforce and functionally weak).
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illustrated how limited tax treaties can be in their practical
application. 101 While Birkenfeld tipped off the United States to
the existence of nearly 50,000 US accounts, the Swiss handed
over just 4,500 after a heated legal battle.102 Some commentators
doubt that the United States could have received even those
4,500 names had the Swiss Parliament not overruled the
decisions of its Federal Administrative Court.103
B. The -Empire Nation Strikes Back
The UBS incident demonstrated to the United States
government that it could no longer rely on QIs to accurately
report account information to the IRS.104 As the DOJ continues
to investigate Swiss banks, perhaps the most noticeable
development has been what it describes as "dramatic behavior
changes," largely due to the perception that the Unite States will
ultimately be successful in its probes.105 The DOJ reported an
101. See Bachmann, supra note 82 (detailing how Switzerland viewed its blocking
order as "reasonable" given its view that the United States had broken the terms of
their treaty that permits the exchange of tax information only in individual cases where
a "specific and justified request is made"); see also Browning, supra note 85, at B3
(describing how an exchange of information pursuant to a treaty request was only
permissible for 250 US taxpayers).
102. See Peter J. Henning, What's Next for Swiss Bank Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Feb. 3, 2010, 1:27 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes. com/2010/02/03/whats-next-for-
swiss-bank-secrecy/ (reporting that the deal to hand over 4,500 names to the IRS
"ended the quest to compel the bank to disclose records on more than 50,000
accounts"); see also Morse, supra note 68, at 701 (detailing how the IRS targeted 50,000
UBS accounts during the investigation).
103. See David Kocieniewski, Get Out ofJail Free? No, It's Better, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2012, at Al (pointing out that the information that Birkenfeld provided was "so
helpful" that he would receive the largest ever whistleblower prize in US history); see
also Laura Saunders & Robin Sidel, histleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST.J. (Sept. 11,
2012, 7:24 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444017504577
645412614237708.html (noting that Birkenfeld's detailed descriptions in the case
against UBS lifted the veil of Swiss bank secrecy).
104. See Susan C. Morse, An Analysis of the FBAR High Penalty Regime, in IRS
RESEARCH BULLETIN: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE 49, 57
(Martha Eller Gangi & Allan Plumley eds., 2011) (articulating that the QI Agreement
contained a "less-than-airtight" provision that UBS exploited); see also Szarmach, supra
note 82, at 422-23 (explaining that UBS was able to take advantage of a loophole that
did not explicitly obligate a QI to disclose the identity of US beneficial owners of non-
US-named accounts).
105. See I.R.S. Commissioner Doug Shulman, Statement on UBS/Voluntary
Disclosure Program (Nov. 16, 2010) [hereinafter I.R.S. Commissioner Statement],
available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Commissioner-Doug-Shulman's-Statement-on-
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unprecedented number of US citizens voluntarily coming clean
to the IRS for fear that their assets would be discovered
eventually. 106 Furthermore, the DOJ has been able to obtain a
number of convictions and plea agreements with US citizens
who hid money in UBS accounts. 107
1.Voluntary Disclosure: Oh Come, All Ye Faithful
Citing a favorable atmosphere in the light of the continued
prosecutions of tax evaders and facilitators, on March 26, 2009,
two years after the DPA with UBS, the IRS announced its 2009
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative ("2009 OVDI").108 The
2009 OVDI was designed to encourage taxpayers with hidden
offshore assets and income to "come back into the tax
system." 109 Those who came forward would avoid the risk of
UBS-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program (" [T]hose who try to skirt U.S. tax laws by hiding
assets and income offshore, and the banks and advisors who help them do it, will find
themselves increasingly at risk due to our efforts in this area."); see also Offshore
Compliance Initiative, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://wwwjustice.gov/tax/
offshore-compliance intiative.htm (noting that the DPA with UBS has produced a
dramatic change in individual taxpayer compliance).
106. See Tax Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FY 2013 Congressional Budget 10,
available at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:1dON-p7ERMcJ:
wwwjustice.gov/jmd/2013justification/office/fyl3-tax-justification.docx+&cd=4&hl=
en&ct=clnk&gl=us ("Put simply, the word is out that placing assets in foreign accounts
no longer provides the protection from disclosure it once did."); see also 2013 Press
Release, supra note 88 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Kathryn Keneally that "time
is rapidly running out for taxpayers who think they can still hide").
107. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT § II-20 (2011) (describing the various prosecution results of each of the
investigations so far, including thirty-one guilty pleas and two ten-year prison sentences
for US taxpayers); see also Offshore Compliance Initiative, supra note 105 (providing links
and case descriptions of a number of successful voluntary disclosure program
participants).
108. See I.R.S. News Release, IR-2009-84 (Sept. 21, 2009) ("Those taxpayers who
do not voluntarily disclose their hidden accounts by the new deadline face much
harsher civil penalties, where applicable, and possible criminal prosecution."); see also
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAx ADMIN., THE 2009 OFFSHORE VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE INITIATIVE INCREASED TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, BUT SOME IMPROVEMENTS
ARE NEEDED 1 (2011) [hereinafter TIGTA REPORT] (giving an overview of the 2009
OVDI).
109. See TIGTA Report, supra note 108, at 1 (noting the purpose of the 2009
OVDI); see also Offshore Voluntaty Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and
Answers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (June 26, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/
International-Taxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Frequently-Asked-
Questions-and-Answers (outlining the incentive structure of the 2009 OVDI).
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substantial penalties and increased risk of criminal prosecution
if later caught by the IRS. 110
The results of the initiative greatly exceeded expectations.
While originally planning on receiving approximately 1,000
disclosures, the 2009 OVDI produced in excess of 14,700
disclosures."' As Robert McKenzie, a tax attorney who has
handled a number of high-net-worth OVDI clients, has
speculated, the IRS has initiated these OVDIs in order to "scare
people out of the woodwork."11 2 All motives aside, the programs
have been undoubtedly successful, as IRS Commissioner Doug
Shulman reported that closed cases had averaged more than
US$200,000 in tax collections per case.113
2. Fool Me Once, Shame on You; Fool Me Twice, Enjoy an
Automatic Information Reporting Scheme
Given the success of the OVDIs, it was clear to US
authorities that there were many more taxpayers who could, and
should, be brought back into the tax system. 114 And, as the UBS
incident revealed, the IRS is at a significant disadvantage in its
pursuit of tax evaders whose assets were held in countries with
strict bank secrecy laws such as Switzerland. 115 As a result, the US
110. See I.R.S., Voluntary Disclosure Practice, IRM 9.5.11.9 (Dec. 2, 2009) (providing
an overview of the program); see also TIGTA REPORT, supra note 108, at 1-2 (explaining
the incentive structure to induce compliance earlier rather than later).
111. See I.R.S. Commissioner Statement, supra note 105 (reporting that over
18,000 individuals over the length of the program's history have brought themselves
back into the US tax system); see also TIGTA REPORT, supra note 108, at 4 (citing the
disclosure figures).
112. Javet Novack, UBS Cheats Can Still Come Clean, FORBES (Sept. 07, 2008, 6:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/08/irs-ubs-taxes-biz-beltway-cz jn 0709beltway
.html (quoting Robert McKenzie on the IRS's use ofJohn Doe summons and OVDI).
113. I.R.S. Commissioner Statement, supra note 105.
114. See Edward Tanenbaum, FATCA Brings More Voluntary Disclosures, 41 TAX
MGM'T INT'LJ. 517, 517 (2012) ("With the looming FATCA disclosures, taxpayers are
beginning to see an end to historical bank secrecy as we know it."); see also Eric van
Aalst, FATCA Reporting for Non-Financial Foreign Entities, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM
(July 5, 2012), http://wealthmanagement.com/taxes/fatca-reporting-non-financial-
foreign-entities (arguing that the US Congress drafted FATCA as a reaction to both the
UBS DPA and the self-disclosure of US taxpayers).
115. See Peter Lattman, Swiss Bank Pleads Guilty to Helping American Tax Dodgers,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013, at B5 (reporting that, even in the wake of the UBS
prosecution, Wegelin managed to lure former UBS clients to Wegelin); see also Sanat
Vallikappen, U.S. Millionaires Told Go Away as Tax Evasion Rule Looms, BLOOMBERG (May
8, 2012, 11:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-08/u-s-millionaires-
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Congress enacted Title V of the HIRE Act, FATCA, with the
purpose of "clamping down on offshore tax evasion," and giving
the United States new tools to "detect, deter and discourage
offshore tax abuses."116
Under the new FATCA regime, all FFIs are subject to thirty
percent withholding on all payments from US-sourced
income.117 Withholding, the process by which the United States
generally ensures that it can tax income against non-US persons
or business entities that might not have a substantial presence in
the United States but still derive income from US-sources,
functions by requiring withholding agents to withhold thirty
percent of the amount paid from the US-source by the agent
that may not be effectively connected with the conduct of the
non-US person or entity.118 Any, and presumably every, FFI that
wishes to avoid this tax must enter into an agreement with the
IRS to identify US accounts and report: (1) the name, address,
and Tax Identification Number ("TIN") of each US
accountholder; (2) the account number; (3) the account
balance or value; and (4) the gross receipts and gross
withdrawals or payments from the accounts. 119 An FFI is further
obligated to report annually to the IRS on its financial accounts
held by US taxpayers, or by entities in which US taxpayers hold a
told-go-away-as-tax-evasion-rule-looms.html (explaining that FATCA was introduced
"after Zurich-based UBS AG said in 2009 that it aided tax evasion by Americans").
116. See Press Release, Representative Sander Levin (D-MI), Levin Calls for End
to Offshore Tax Abuse (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://levin.house.gov/press-
release/levin-calls-end-offshore-tax-abuse (describing the purpose of FATCA, from one
of the Act's co-sponsors); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury and
IRS Issue Final Regulations to Combat Offshore Tax Evasion (Jan. 17, 2013), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl825.aspx
[hereinafter Jan. 17 Press Release] (declaring that Congress enacted FATCA to target
non-compliance by US taxpayers).
117. See 26 U.S.C. § 1471 (2012) (pertaining to withholdable payments to FFIs
under FATCA).
118. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1); § 881 (pertaining to withholdable payments
generally); see also § 1441; § 1442 (applying this concept of withholding tax to FATCA
to incentivize compliance).
119. I.R.C. § 1471; see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 111TH CONG.,
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE "FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT OF 2009"
18 (Joint Comm. Print 2009) [hereinafter JCX FATCA]; see generally DLA Piper, The
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), http://www.dlapiper.com/files/
Uploads/Documents/FATCA-Alert.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2013) [hereinafter DLA
Piper FATCA] (providing a succinct overview of the provisions).
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substantial ownership interest.120 Further, a compliant FFI must
withhold and pay to the IRS any payments of US-source income,
and withhold upon, or close, the accounts of individual
accountholders who fail to provide sufficient information to
determine their citizenship or any entity accountholders who
fail to provide sufficient information to determine whether it is
substantially US-owned (collectively, "Recalcitrant Accounts").121
This provision closes the loophole that allowed UBS to simply
ignore Recalcitrant Accounts in the past.122
For the purposes of FATCA, a withholdable payment
includes: (1) any payment of interest, dividends, rents, salaries,
wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations,
emoluments, and other FDAP gains, profits, and US-source
income; and (2) any gross proceeds from the sale or disposition
of any property of a type which can produce interest or
dividends from sources within the United States. 123
Furthermore, FFIs must attempt to obtain a waiver of any non-
US law that would prevent reporting the required information
or close the account. 124
C. Assessing FATCA's Value in the Market for Information
As Professor Steven A. Dean opines, there is a market for
tax account information. 125 Congress enacted FATCA based on
the demonstrated need to acquire account information from
120. § 1471 (b) (1) (C).
121. § 1471 (defining, generally, a "substantial United States owner," as a US
citizen who owns a ten percent stake in a corporation, partnership, or trust); see DLA
Piper FATCA, supra note 119, § I.F (explaining that FFIs are required to shut a
recalcitrant account down if it does not impose the required withholding tax on the
account).
122. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (detailing how UBS
intentionally created a situation in which they "wouldn't know" the national origin of
some of their accountholders).
123. § 1473(1).
124. See § 1471(b) (1) (F); see also I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, IRB 2010-37 (original
notice and request for comments in implementing FATCA).
125. See Dean, Incomplete Market, supra note 61, at 606 (arguing that the
participants in this market are typically individuals and businesses, and that while
governments "rely heavily on information, usually they do not pay for that
information"); see also Alex Rashkolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit,
Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 569, 642 (2006) (explaining
that millions of taxpayers earn income "not subject to any monitoring regime," and are
thus incentivized to shift billions in assets towards tax havens).
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citizens who hold assets in overseas institutions. 126 The failure of
the QI program, as exemplified by the UBS scandal and
subsequent actions by Switzerland, brought to light many
limitations inherent in these agreements that the United States
had been signing with tax haven countries. 127 The largest
hindrance to enforcing tax laws, and the greatest hurdle to
FATCA's success, is extraterritorial information asymmetry. 128
This asymmetry exists because the taxpayer theoretically knows
which transactions should be reported to the IRS, but the IRS
lacks the same knowledge unless the taxpayer voluntarily
discloses it or it is obtained from a third party.129 While then
Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill denounced OECD's 1998
Report for dictating what a country's tax rates should be, he did,
however, explicitly acknowledge that the United States needs
information from offshore countries to prosecute tax evaders.130
Tax havens can prove particularly obstructionist to other,
126. SeeJan. 17 Press Release, supra note 116 (announcing that FATCA requires
FFIs to report to the IRS information about financial accounts held by US taxpayers);
see also Scratched by the FA TCA, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2011, at 86, 86-87 (noting that in
fund managers' attempts to report information about their client to the IRS, there
might be "several layers of intermediation between the fund" and the client that the
manager would have "to look through all these layers").
127. SeeJCX QI, supra note 97, at 9 (outlining some of the weaknesses of the QI
agreement with UBS); see also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text
(demonstrating how the Swiss MLAT proved largely ineffectual).
128. See Dean, Incomplete Market, supra note 61, at 630 ("The heart of the problem
lies in the vast gulf between the information to which tax authorities have access
domestically and the information they are able to collect abroad."); see also Leandra
Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When is Information Reporting
Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1733, 1734-36 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman,
Reducing Information Gaps] (explaining that information reporting is largely used to
address this deficiency).
129. See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 128, at 1733 (explaining
that the government is "forced to play catch-up," and must rely solely on the taxpayer's
honesty or third-party reporting); see also Rashkolnikov, supra note 125, at 611
(explaining that evasion on income not subject to information reporting is "simple ...
one simply falsifies the income on the return").
130. See Press Release, Paul O'Neill, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Treasury (May 10, 2001),
available at http:// www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po366.aspx
[hereinafter O'Neill Press Release] (reporting that the United States could never have
obtained convictions of tax evaders that were using the Cayman Islands without a TIEA
with the Cayman Islands).
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higher-tax-liability nations by withholding or failing to collect
this critical information. 131
1. Bilateral Holdout and Flight Incentive
FATCA attempts to solve extraterritorial tax information
asymmetry by enlisting FFIs to pull US taxpayers back into the
IRS's information scheme.132 FFIs must now directly provide the
account information that the IRS had been unable to access
under the previous QI program, or be deemed
"noncompliant." 133 FATCA will attempt to force compliance
with increased penalties and a hefty thirty percent withholding
tax on noncompliant FFIs. 134
Consequently, FATCA's bilateral nature may potentially be
subject to the problem that Professors Dean and Rosenzweig
argue are inherent in bilateral treaties with tax havens: the
holdout incentive created by tax arbitrage.135 Tax havens provide
the structure and incentive for US taxpayers to engage in tax
arbitrage, whereby assets are shifted into offshore accounts in
lower-tax jurisdictions to avoid higher domestic taxes. 136 In
131. See, e.g., supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (highlighting some of the
practical limitations of TIEAs).
132. See 26 U.S.C. § 1471(c)(1) (2012) (requiring that compliant FFIs report
directly to the IRS on an annual basis the name, address, TIN, account number,
account balance, and gross receipts and withdrawals of all US clients); see also Remy
Farag, Shulman Discusses Joint Audits and FATCA Developments, J. INT'L TAX'N, Sept. 2010,
at 5, 5 (quoting IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman as saying that FATCA is "the most
important international information reporting legislation enacted in a generation").
133. See § 1471(c) (1) (describing the agreement that FFIs must enter into with
the IRS); see alsoJCX QI, supra note 97, at 8-10 (using the case of UBS to exemplify the
weaknesses of the previous QI program).
134. See § 1471(a) (mandating a thirty percent tax deduction for all FFIs that do
not meet the reporting and due diligence requirements); see also Farag, supra note 132,
at 6 (asserting that FATCA increases information reporting through the "imposition of
stiff penalties for failure to comply" by US citizens and increased withholding taxes on
FFIs).
135. See Dean, Incomplete Market, supra note 61, at 628-30 (" [T]he existence of
offshore tax havens provides a form of 'virtual' expatriation: tax flight."); see also
Rosenzweig, International Arbitrage, supra note 23, at 584-86 (arguing that while
multilateral cooperation might overcome this problem, international tax arbitrage
suffers from this holdout problem).
136. See Dean, More Cooperation, supra note 43, at 147 (explaining that tax flight
occurs when taxpayers "camouflage" their assets offshore); see also Adam H.
Rosenzweig, MYy Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM & MARY L. REV. 923, 940 (2010)
[hereinafter Rosenzweig, Tax Havens] (providing one view that tax havens distort
economic decision making).
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theory, this shifting of assets occurs only because of the
favorable tax implications.13 7
For example, if two countries, Country A and Country B,
share a Double Taxation Agreement for a single item of income,
Item X, there would be no advantage to shifting Item X between
Country A or B. 13 8 The ultimate tax liability would be effectively
identical either through harmonization or a tax credit. 139 A tax
haven, Country C, however, distorts this equilibrium of tax
liabilities by introducing a tax advantage that potentially diverts
the tax revenue on Item X away from either Country A or
Country B, and towards Country C. 14 0
Although FATCA's automatic reporting requirements
address previous shortcomings in the fight over global
information asymmetry, the onerous withholding penalties do
not fully disincentive tax arbitrage. 141 Thus, there will always be
137. See Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to
Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 928-29
(2007) [hereinafter Dean, Philosopher Kings] (defining tax flight); see also Rosenzweig,
Tax Havens, supra note 136, at 930 (2010) (describing the relationship between tax
havens and tax competition).
138. See Rosenzweig, Tax Havens, supra note 136, at 951 (" [If Country A and
Country C had Double Taxation Agreements], there would be no amount of tax
competition Country C could engage in to attract the capital. Even if Country C offered
a zero tax rate, the capital would have no incentive to leave Country A since it would
pay the full Country A tax regardless of where it was located. The only thing that makes
tax competition a useful instrument for Country C is the ability to exploit the anti-
double-taxation regimes of Country A."); Dean, Philosopher Kings, supra note 137, at 943
(noting that the "extraordinary success of bilateral double tax treaties" is usually
attributed to their impact on taxpayer decision making).
139. SeeJulie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax
Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 554 (2001) ("One of the tenets of the tax harmonization
argument [with, for example, DTAs] is that competition will force all jurisdictions to
lower their tax rates to the same low (or zero) levels, such that no country will offer
investors a 'better' tax deal relative to other countries."); see also Rosenzweig, Tax
Havens, supra note 137, at 936-39 (providing an example of how a DTA might affect
the business decisions of a multinational corporation).
140. See Dean, More Cooperation, supra note 43, at 128-29 (explaining how tax
havens provide the option of virtual expatriation); see also Adam Rosenzweig, Thinking
Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 Wis. L. REv. 717, 720 (2012) [hereinafter Rosenzweig, Tax
Treaty] (describing an issue that "plagues" modern international tax regimes as that of
"double non-taxation, or escaping tax altogether").
141. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (describing the FATCA
reporting requirements); see also Rosenzweig, Tax Havens, supra note 136, at 940
(providing that tax arbitrage exists to minimize tax liability).
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an incentive to holdout from entering into an agreement.142
According to Professor Susan C. Morse's analysis of high-penalty
regimes, the success of FATCA depends on: (1) penalty
credibility; (2) detection and information strategies; and (3) the
lack of close substitutes. 143 The automatic reporting
requirements and withholding tax may effectively mitigate
concerns with respect to (1) and (2), but the existence of tax
havens provide "close substitutes" for penalized behavior and
may undermine FATCA's effectiveness.1 44 As Professor Morse
argues, "[t]he success of a high penalty for a particular
infraction requires the absence of sufficiently close substitutes
for the penalized action. The penalty will be less effective if the
taxpayer can make choices that achieve the goal of tax evasion
without incurring a penalty." 145 Thus, FATCA would be
unsuccessful as a high-penalty regime if FFIs and US taxpayers
view a noncompliant FF1 or country as a close substitute of a
compliant FF1 or country.146
Although FATCA fails to address this phenomenon, the tax
treaties and agreements discussed in Part I.B attempt to
minimize the incentive to engage in tax arbitrage through tax
142. SeeJ. Richard Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider's Summary of FATCA and its
Potential Future, 57 VILL. L. REv. 471, 480 (2012) (noting that the new QI system
"needed to have a penalty" that came in the form of the imposition of a withholding
tax on noncompliant FFIs); see also Morse, supra note 68, at 724-25 ( "[A]t first
glance ... FATCA's withholding penalty is so onerous that it must be avoided at all
costs.").
143. See Morse, supra note 68, at 688-93 (arguing that all three components are
required for effective high-penalty reporting regimes); see also Leandra Lederman, The
Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1508
(2003) (arguing that it may be possible to increase tax compliance "by reducing the
opportunity for noncompliance, such as through increased enforcement of the tax
laws").
144. See Morse, supra note 68, at 691-92 (explaining that the absence of close
substitutes is the "key to success" to a strategy that imposes high penalties); see also
Dean, Philosopher Kings, supra note 137, at 958 (describing that, in the market for tax
flight assets, if two states are close substitutes, assets would be shifted to the substitute
state if the other state entered into a bilateral treaty).
145. Morse, supra note 68, at 691.
146. See Dean, Philosopher Kings, supra note 140, at 958 (arguing that flight
jurisdiction residents have two options: (1) to repatriate their assets in their home
jurisdiction; or (2) the "more likely of the two if the remaining havens are close
substitutes for the former haven . . . to relocate their assets to another haven"); see also
Morse, supra note 68, at 726-27 ("The success of FATCA thus depends on the stickiness
of global investment in U.S. securities.")
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flight.147 DTAs can minimize this incentive by granting credits or
exemptions for a tax on items that would otherwise be taxed
twice. 148 Some commentators maintain, however, that bilateral
TIEAs, like the ones the United States has signed with numerous
tax havens, have been of questionable efficacy. 149 TIEAs were
designed to solve fundamental information asymmetry so as to
make tax evasion more difficult. 150 There are, however, a
number of inherent limitations, namely: (1) the US TIEAs
currently in force operate under a request-only basis, meaning
that the IRS would have to know the identity of the suspected
tax evader prior to the treaty request; and (2) these TIEAs
typically do not require that a signatory country override its
domestic laws, enact new laws, or create databases that do not
already exist. 15 1 Lee Sheppard, of the nonprofit group Tax
Analysts, has gone so far as to assert that "TIEAs were designed
not to work."15 2 As the UBS scandal demonstrated, request-only
147. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (clarifying how DTAs can be
used to minimize tax flight); supra notes 76-80 (providing a description of TIEAs,
where taxpayers would not engage in tax flight if the IRS would have information of
their offshore accounts).
148. See Curtin, supra note 41, at 35 (detailing the mechanics of DTAs); see also
Dean, More Cooperation, supra note 43, at 145 (arguing that DTAs take "two tax regimes
that are similar and refine those similarities").
149. See Dean, Incomplete Market, supra note 61, at 650 (maintaining that although
the TIEAs have enjoyed some success, they have failed to "provide a silver bullet for the
tax flight problem"); see also Yates et. al., supra note 20, at 53 (arguing that, while many
countries have rushed to enter into TIEAs, their effectiveness is uncertain).
150. See Dean, Incomplete Market, supra note 61, at 650-51 (describing stand-alone
TIEAs as "symmetrical agreements, giving each country access to information from the
other, [though] access to extraterritorial tax information was much more important to
the United States than to its potential counterparties"); see also Leandra Lederman,
Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV.
695, 697-99 (2007) (noting that information reporting systems are "highly successful at
securing compliance").
151. See Yates et al, supra note 20, at 53-54 (providing an example of the level of
specificity needed to effect a treaty request); see also Nick Gregory, Lax Tax: The Threat
of Secrecy jurisdictions and What the International Community Should Do About It, 20
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 859, 880 (2012) (explaining that, in essence, a
TIEA would not lead to information that the US would not already know); see alsoJANE
G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAx HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 22 (2013) (providing the example that even if the British
Virgin Islands, a "country with more than 400,000 registered corporations, where laws
require no identification of shareholders or directors, and require no financial
records" signed a TIEA, it would be unclear as to what information could actually be
exchanged).
152. Sheppard, supra note 68, at 255.
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information exchange agreements can be inadequate when the
requestor does not know, with any level of specificity, the name
of the taxpayer it wishes the receiver to produce.153
While, as Professor Rosenzweig has argued, multilateral
agreements could limit non-cooperation between havens and
non-havens, the success of these potential solutions in
preventing tax arbitrage depends on overcoming a holdout
problem. 154 As Professor Dean clarifies, assuming that US
taxpayers can "easily substitute another jurisdiction in their tax
avoidance schemes, then entering into TIEAs or tax flight
treaties with fewer than all potential substitute jurisdictions
simultaneously would be futile." 15 5 Although he qualifies this
assertion by maintaining that there is reason to believe that not
all jurisdictions act as "easy" substitutes for one another,
nevertheless, the "threat of holdouts in this context remains
significant." 15 6 Thus, countries that have not yet entered into
TIEAs might be less incentivized to do so if holding out could
mean that assets would be diverted from a newly compliant
"haven" and into the holdout jurisdiction 1 57
To illustrate, assume that the United States has entered into
three TIEAs with tax havens, Countries B, C, and D. If these are
153. See Spencer, Major Advance, supra note 64, at 14 (arguing that, as a practical
matter, tax haven jurisdictions cannot engage in automatic exchange because they do
not obtain tax information from residents and therefore do not have the information
to automatically exchange); see also Zagaris, Sticks and Carrots, supra note 69, at 341
(noting the procedural difficulties of receiving information that a tax haven would not
ordinarily collect).
154. See Dean, More Cooperation, supra note 43, at 160 (maintaining that states
seeking to bargain will be subject to the holdout problem); see also Rosenzweig,
International Arbitrage, supra note 23, at 583-86 (arguing that this holdout problem
disincentivizes bilateral and multilateral treaty formation).
155. Dean, More Cooperation, supra note 43, at 160.
156. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 1584 n.27 (noting that because one holdout is
sufficient to create a haven, TIEAs have proven ineffective); see also Rosenzweig,
InternationalArbitrage, supra note 23, at 585-86 ("As each additional country agrees to a
multilateral solution preventing tax arbitrage, it becomes increasingly beneficial to the
remaining countries to holdout from the agreement.")
157. See Rosenzweig, Tax Havens, supra note 136, at 952 (explaining the outcome
of a game between two non-haven countries and one haven country that needs to
attract capital to meet its minimum tax base); see also Gregory, supra note 151, at 886
("If any one country were to end its privacy policies it would lose out on capital flow
and funds would be diverted to other countries that maintain secrecy jurisdictions. In
this sense, there is a perverse incentive not to become more transparent but rather to
be the last secrecy jurisdiction standing.")
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the only three tax havens in the world, then absent other
considerations, there is little reason for a US citizen to move his
or her assets to an FFI in Country B, C, or D if the United States
will have knowledge of the transaction and tax it identically.
Contrastingly, assume that the United States has entered into
the same three TIEAS, but there are now six tax havens,
Countries B, C, D, E, F, and G. Individuals now have the
opportunity to invest their money at more favorable rates if they
avoided Countries B, C, and D. Furthermore, Countries E, F,
and G now have less of an incentive to enter into a TIEA. FFIs
located within these countries similarly have less of an incentive
to enter into a FATCA agreement because the assets from
Countries B, C, and D would likely be diverted to the FFIs
located in Countries E, F and G, allowing them to benefit from
the tax revenues generated by the new investment. Even in a
multilateral agreement, this holdout problem may be pervasive:
it becomes increasingly beneficial for countries to holdout from
joining in the multilateral efforts to prevent international tax
arbitrage.1 58
2. Tax Flight Treaties: Overcoming Potential Holdouts
As a potential solution to FATCA's shortcomings, Professors
Dean and Rosenzweig propose that a tax flight treaty could serve
to potentially alleviate many of the problems posed by holdouts
by aligning the incentives of tax havens with that of non-haven
jurisdictions. 15 9 Following Professor Dean's model, a tax flight
treaty would consist of: (1) a tax haven committing to develop
the information infrastructure that would permit it to fully
participate in the "exchange-of-information net" that source
countries require to enforce their tax regimes; and (2) in
exchange, the flight jurisdiction could agree to pay the
158. See Dean, More Cooperation, supra note 43, at 160-61 (detailing how
substitutability can affect individual taxpayer choices); see also Rosenzweig, International
Arbitrage, supra note 23, at 584-86 (arguing that, while multinational cooperation
might alleviate some of the deficiencies of bilateral treaties, they still suffer from a
"substantial" holdout problem).
159. See Dean, Philosopher Kings, supra note 137, at 957-58 (arguing that a tax
flight treaty offers a "new alternative" that could prove effective in reducing tax flight);
see also Rosenzweig, Tax Havens, supra note 136, at 985 n.217 (providing further
explanation of Professor Dean's tax flight model).
2013] 1801
1802 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1767
cooperating tax haven with a portion of the additional tax
revenues generated by that haven's compliance. 160
Professor Rosenzweig has further argued that by offering
havens the tax revenue generated from resolving a specific tax
dispute, it could better incentivize cooperation. 161 Thus, he
asserts that cooperation can be gained by first identifying a
"prize" to induce compliance. 162 This prize can serve as the
haven's revenue under a tax flight treaty, which can be "Pareto
superior to a world with an undersupplied public good," i.e.
extraterritorial tax information. 163 In this way, for the "first time
in the rise of the modern international tax regime," tax havens
can directly benefit from joining their non-haven global
counterparts. 16 4 Tax havens sheltering the most assets therefore
receive the most compensation.1 65
D. The Global Impact of the FATCA Regime
FATCA draws upon lessons of history and responds to the
demonstrated failures of the current tax system under Qualified
Intermediary Agreements, Double Taxation Agreements, and
160. See Dean, Philosopher Kings, supra note 137, at 957-58 (arguing that because
the amount of revenue lost to tax flight relative to the size of a typical haven, "the tax
flight treaty would be a perfect fit"); see also Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The
Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAx L. REV. 169,
187 n.55 (2008) (describing Professor Dean's theory as buying off tax havens).
161. See Dean, Philosopher Kings, supra note 137, at 958 (noting that, at first, this
quid pro quo might seem "perverse, as though tax havens are being rewarded for bad
behavior"); see also Rosenzweig, Tax Treaty, supra note 140, at 726 (describing one
compliance mechanism as: letting poorer countries keep the benefits of a specific
taxpayer dispute in exchange for an agreed upon set of baseline rules).
162. See Rosenzweig, Tax Treaty, supra note 140, at 726 (explaining that, in the
aggregate, the lottery is the "single pool of uncollected tax revenue," or, essentially, the
global tax gap).
163. See Rosenzweig, Tax Treaty, supra note 140, at 726 (explaining that the trick
is to "find something to serve as the prize").
164. See Rosenzweig, Tax Treaty, supra note 140, at 727; see also Tyler J.
Winkleman, Automatic Information Exchange as a Multilateral Solution to Tax Havens, 22
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 193, 210-11 (2012) (demonstrating the benefit of revenue
sharing as opposed to outright buying of the tax information).
165. See Rosenzweig, Tax Treaty, supra note 140, at 756 (describing the lottery
mechanism as "making it more appealing for nonmembers to join"); see also
Winkleman, supra note 164, at 210-11 (explaining that the lottery system would
disincentivize noncompliance).
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Tax Information Exchange Agreements. 166 Scholars note that
information asymmetry will always exist if, in the end, the
necessary information cannot be obtained from the individual
taxpayers or overseas banks. 167 But, FATCA represents an
abandonment of the United States' previous policy of
negotiating with countries and attempting to sign DTAs or
TIEAs, instead dealing directly with FFIs first and forcing
countries interested in remaining in US markets to negotiate. 168
1. The FATCA Method of Entering the Information Market
FATCA may solve the problems posed by information
asymmetry by forcing FFIs to internalize the cost of this
asymmetry. 169 FFIs will now be subject to extensive information
reporting requirements.17 0 Not only will FFIs need to identify
their US accountholders, but FATCA also requires FFIs to report
annually on gross receipts and gross payments throughout the
life of the account.171 Required automatic reporting, according
to the IRS, reduces some of the ineffectiveness of request-only
information exchange agreements, especially as they pertain to
countries that otherwise would not collect such information in
the first place, notably, tax havens.17 2
166. See Yates et al, supra note 20, at 55-56 (describing the "questionable
effectiveness" of TIEAs); see also REP. ON TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 76 (explaining
UBS was able to exploit deficiencies in the QI system and those inherent in DTAs and
TIEAs with countries with stricter bank secrecy laws).
167. See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 128, at 1733 (addressing
the issue of information asymmetry); see also Samantha H. Scavron, In Pursuit of Offshore
Tax Evaders: The Increased Importance of International Cooperation, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICSJ. 157, 183 (2010) (explaining that finding out information is a "pivotal
step" for the IRS, but is useless if, in the end, the IRS has no way of obtaining the
necessary evidence).
168. See 26 U.S.C. § 1471 (a) (2012) (providing an overview of the reporting
requirements); see also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing the refusal
of the Swiss Federal Administrative Court as a poignant example of why governments
with disparate banking laws could be difficult to work with).
169. See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 128, at 1733 (explaining
that information reporting schemes force the private parties required to report to
internalize the cost); see also Scavron, supra note 167, at 178-84 (outlining the various
unilateral methods for gathering information).
170. § 1471(c).
171. Id.
172. See Farag, supra note 132, at 5 (arguing that FATCA gives the IRS the tools to
crack down on tax evasion by requiring FFIs to report account information directly to
the IRS); see also Yates et al., supra note 20, at 55-56 (noting that FATCA's enhanced
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FATCA has also been successful in sparking an influx of
voluntary disclosures. 173 Although FATCA's most sweeping
provisions are set to gradually phase in between 2013 to 2018,
the success of the 2009 and 2011 voluntary disclosure programs
and the threat of "beefed up" enforcement posed by third party
reporting has led the IRS to enact an open-ended offshore
voluntary disclosure program. 174 To entice disclosure, the party
that "speaks up first is key. If the IRS has any details, it's too late
to get the [OVDI] package deal." 175 Already the IRS has
announced that its disclosure programs have yielded more than
US$5 billion in recovered tax revenue, far in excess of its
expectations. 176
FATCA has further prompted the widespread creation of
new FATCA-compliant intergovernmental agreements
("IGAs"). 177 In July 2012, the US Treasury Department
and mandatory disclosure requirements "ease the government's burden in prosecuting
tax cases involving offshore compliance").
173. See TIGTA REPORT, supra note 108 (illustrating the success of the program
thus far); see alsoJeremy Tempkin, Offshore Voluntaty Disclosure Part III - Yet Another Last
Chance for Taxpayers, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2012, 11:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
insider/2012/01/11/offshore-voluntary-disclosure-part-iii-yet-another-last-chance-for-
taxpayers/ (reporting the IRS's third OVDI resulting from the success of the previous
programs); see also 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/2012-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program (last visited Aug.
22, 2013) (providing an outline of the to-date success of the programs with case
studies).
174. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64 (June 26, 2012) (providing the IRS's
explanation as to the success of the program thus far); see also Tempkin, supra note 173
(noting that, regardless of their motives for not "coming clean" in the first two
programs, taxpayers with undisclosed assets can still enter the program). On July 12,
2013, the IRS and DQJ again changed the compliance timelines to reflect comments
received expressing practical difficulties with FATCA's implementation. See I.R.S.
Notice 2013-43.
175. Robert W. Wood, FATCA Cliff Tax Evasion Guilty Plea and Death for Oldest
Swiss Bank, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2013, 11:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
robertwood/2013/01/03/global-banking-cliff-fatca-irs-guilty-plea-and-death-for-oldest-
swiss-bank/ (adding that the IRS and DOJ are coming into a "goldmine of data" from
bank deals and whistleblowers).
176. I.R.S. News Release, supra note 174 (reporting 33,000 voluntary disclosures
under the first two programs); see also Tempkin, supra note 173 (outlining the success
of the first two programs).
177. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, U.S. Engaging with More than 50
Jurisdictions to Curtail Offshore Tax Evasion (Nov. 8, 2012), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1759.aspx (reporting
that the Treasury Department is "continuing to build" international support for
FATCA); see also Keith Lawson, How the Model Intergovernmental Agreement Reduces
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published a model intergovernmental agreement to implement
the withholding and reporting requirements that FATCA
demands.7 8 France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom
endorsed the model agreement, and called for a "speedy
conclusion of bilateral agreements based on the model."179 The
US Treasury Department has since announced that it has been
engaging with more than fifty jurisdictions to help combat
offshore tax evasion through FATCA's implementation. 18 0
2. The Cost of International Cooperation
The most common objection to FATCA has been the cost
of compliance. 181 As the Big Four accounting firm KPMG has
pointed out, while the requirements are "simple in concept,"
they are difficult and costly to implement. 182 According to some
experts, it is entirely possible that the costs associated with
FATCA compliance may be higher than the resulting revenue
gained.183 One consulting firm estimated that compliance costs
FATCA Burdens, INVEST. CO. INST. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.ici.org/viewpoints/
view 12 fatca iga (illustrating some of the features of the FATCA Intergovernmental
Agreements ("IGAs")).
178. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Releases Model
Intergovernmental Agreement for Implementing the Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act to Improve Offshore Tax Compliance and Reduce Burden (July 26, 2012)
[hereinafter Model IGA Press Release], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tgl653.aspx (reporting on the FATCA IGA progress made
by the IRS); see also Lawson, supra note 177 (explaining the features of the IGA).
179. Model IGA Press Release, supra note 178.
180. See id. (announcing the IRS's efforts to enter into agreements with as many
other nations as possible); see also Memorandum from Keith Lawson, Senior Counsel,
Inv. Co. Inst., to Tax Members et al. (July 26, 2012), available at http://www.ici.org/
ops/fund-dist/ci.memo26344.print (detailing specific sections of the FATCA IGAs).
181 . See FATCA - Compliance Costs and Risks, KPMG (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.kpmg.com/us/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/taxnewsflash/
pages/fatca-compliance-costs-and-risks.aspx [hereinafter KPMG Report] (illustrating
FATCA's price tag); see also Robert W. Wood, FA TCA Carries Fat Price Tag, FORBES (Nov.
30, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/11/30/fatca-
carries-fat-price-tag/ (estimating that compliance costs alone could cost financial
institutions US$100 million).
182. See KPMG Report, supra note 181 (expressing doubt as to the financial
viability of the program); see also Dean, Incomplete Market, supra note 61, at 605-06
(noting that governments often do not pay for the tax information they require).
183. See Robert W. Wood, More Bad News for FATCA, FORBES (July 17, 2012, 11:45
PM), http:// www. forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/07/17/more-bad-news-for-
fatca/ (declaring that this argument was "hard to miss"); see also Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA) Executive Summary, DELOITTE (2012),
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might be between US$150 million and US$200 million for every
medium-sized bank.184
Although the IRS has reportedly rejected the possibility of
substantial capital flight, this may not be entirely realistic.185
Capital flight to Asia might be a potentially serious problem.186
For example, UBS in Switzerland has lost approximately US$200
billion worldwide in assets from private banking over the last two
years.187 In Asia, however, UBS has gained more assets due to
capital inflow than it has lost due to capital flight.188 Amid this
growing crackdown on tax evasion, "the rich are flocking to
Singapore and Hong Kong," which offer very attractive banking
incentives.189 While in "active dialogue" with Singapore, the
United States currently has a very limited tax treaty with
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/
Tax/us-tax FATCA ExecutiveSummary 112812.pdf (finding that FATCA is projected
to raise US$7.6 billion over a ten year period).
184. See Ann Hollingshead, You Do the Math: Adding Up the Costs of Complying with
FATCA, FIN. TRANSPARENCY COALITION (Sept. 28, 2011), http://
www.financialtransparency.org/2011/09/28/you-do-the-math-adding-up-the-costs-of-
complying-with-fatca/ (detailing a number of opinions as to the projected costs of
compliance); see also FATCA: Will Thailand Enter Intergovernmental Agreement with US?,
NATION (Thailand) (Jan 31, 2013, 1:00 AM), http://www.nationmultimedia.com/
business/FATCA-Will-Thailand-enter-intergovernmental-agreem-30199055.html
(reporting that the cost of creating a FATCA compliant system for large diversified
financial institutions would be in the "many millions" of US dollars); Morse supra note
68, at 726 (" [Gin the margin, some banks might divest U.S. assets.").
185. See Susan C. Morse, Ask For Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax
Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529, 547 n.105 (2012) [hereinafter Morse, Uncle Sam]
(explaining that the IRS has dismissed these claims, but noting that a 2004 study found
that a weaker version of a similar regulation would cause US$88 billion in capital
flight); Von Daniel Mitchell & Brian Gurst, The Janus Face of US Tax Policy, SCHWEIZER
MONAT (Swiss), http://www.schweizermonat.ch/artikel/thejanus-face-of-us-tax-policy
(last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (theorizing that FATCA may backfire and drive capital away
from the American economy).
186. See Emily Wang, Note, The Opaque Future of Tax Information Between the United
States and China: An Analysis of Bank Secrecy Laws and the Likelihood of Entrance into a Tax
Information Exchange Agreement, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 425-26 (2012)
(illustrating the potential for capital flight); see also Morse, Uncle Sam, supra note 185
(demonstrating that FATCA could likely produce capital flight).
187. See Lynnley Browning, Seeking Bank Secrecy in Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23 2010,
at B3 (reporting on the massive capital flight that Switzerland has experienced as a
result of the DOJ probes of Swiss banks); see also Wang, supra note 186, at 425
(illustrating the capital flight that Switzerland has experienced).
188. See Browning, supra note 186, at B3 (referencing a presentation given by the
bank's chief executive of wealth management, Juirg Zeltner); see also Wang, supra note
186 (illustrating why Asia is a prime location for capital inflow).
189. Browning, supra note 187, at B3.
BUYING FA TCA COMPLIANCE
Singapore, and no taxation treaties whatsoever with Hong Kong,
which is its own Special Administrative Zone within China. 190
Further, the Chinese government has recently stated that it
would likely holdout from a FATCA agreement. 191 Currently, no
countries from the Asia Pacific, a region some commentators
maintain is heavily influenced by Beijing's policy decisions, have
entered into IGAs. 192 Nigel Green, the CEO of a British financial
advisory firm, has speculated that China will not sign an IGA
because it would be difficult to implement due to its disparate
legal system, and that the country "would-thanks to a
laughable lack of reciprocity-benefit very little from it." 193
Based on both China's unwillingness to participate and what he
calls the "fundamentally flawed" nature of FACTA, Mr. Green
predicts that the FATCA project is "beginning to unravel." 19 4
The combination of globalization and technological
advances has had the effect of eroding many of the remaining
barriers to international trade. This erosion, however, has put
increasing pressure on the revenue of jurisdictions, like the
United States, that seek to tax its citizens and resident aliens on
worldwide income, a problem further exacerbated by the
presence of tax havens. These tax havens provide the means by
which individuals and business entities can engage in tax
190. See Robert W. Wood, U.S. Is Doing FATCA Deals With 50 Countries!, FORBES
(Nov. 13, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/11/13/u-
s-is-doing-fatca-deals-with-50-countries/ (listing Singapore as a nation in "active
dialogue" with the DOJ); see also Treaties in Force, supra note 41 (listing all of the treaties
currently in force).
191. Laura Saunders, Offshore Tax Probe Picks Up, WALL ST.J. (Mar. 6, 2013, 5:56
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324034804578344280151020
580.html (reporting that China was a "notable" holdout); see also Lisa Smith, US
Unlikely to Crack China FATCA Agreement, IEXPATS (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.iexpats.com/2013/03/us-unlikely-to-crack-china-fatca-agreement/ (noting
that China has made clear that it is unlikely to comply with FATCA).
192. SeeJonathan Boyd, US FATCA Project 'Beginning to Unravel' Says deVere's Nigel
Green, INV. FUR. (Mar. 5, 2013), http:// www.investmenteurope.net/investment-
europe/feature/2252325/us-fatca-project-beginning-to-unravel-says-deveres-nigel-green
(arguing that the region is heavily influenced by China's economic and political
power); see also Smith, supra note 191 (explaining that, while Japan was reportedly
close, no other Asian country had yet reached a deal).
193. Boyd, supra note 192 (answering the question: "How likely is China not to
sign an IGA with the US?").
194. See id. (arguing that FATCA's flaws might deter other governments from
complying); see also Smith, supra note 191 (quoting a US consulting expert as saying
that the "US has more incentive to sign the IGA than the Chinese government do").
2013] 1807
1808 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1767
arbitrage. Congress passed FATCA in an attempt to prevent tax
arbitrage through an automatic reporting system, which it hopes
will decrease information asymmetry and increase taxpayer
compliance. Implementation of FATCA, however, might not
produce these desired results if it cannot overcome the strong
incentive for havens not to comply.
III. FA TCA'S EFFECT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL TAX
INFORMATION
Part III analyzes FATCA's effectiveness in addressing the
issues of information asymmetry and international tax arbitrage.
Part III.A examines the ways in which FATCA might reduce tax
arbitrage in light of the demonstrated weaknesses of the
international tax treaty system. Part III.B argues that FATCA, as
a high-penalty tax regime, will ultimately fail in its stated
purpose of diminishing tax evasion because noncompliance
would likely produce a higher payoff than compliance. Finally,
Part III.C recommends that, in place of FATCA, the United
States should adopt a tax flight treaty to align the interests of
potential noncompliant countries with that of the United States.
A. How FTCA Advances the Fight Against Tax Evasion
The international tax treaty system is rife with opportunities
for both individual taxpayers and financial institutions alike to
evade taxes. 195 As the size of the tax gap suggests, the United
States has been unable to overcome information asymmetry
under these traditional tax treaties. 196 No example is more
representative of this institution-wide practice of exploitation
than the UBS scandal. 197
MLATs are virtually useless in the prosecution of tax
evaders. 198 TIEAs could be effective in the absence of
information asymmetry. They are not, however, because the
195. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (describing how the current
DOJ investigations into Swiss banks exemplify the types of opportunities available to tax
arbitrageurs).
196. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (addressing the tax gap).
197. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (describing the UBS scandal).
198. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing the major
shortcomings of the use of MLATs).
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nations with which the United States currently has TIEAs do not
ordinarily collect the tax information sought.199 Article 26 of the
OECD Model Treaty, incorporated into many DTAs, has proven
to be ineffective because, in many instances, the United States
did not know enough information about the taxpayer to effect a
treaty request.200
FATCA will make tax evasion significantly more difficult by
taking giant steps in reducing information asymmetry.201 As
exemplified by UBS and Switzerland, but applicable with nearly
every tax haven, it is exceedingly difficult to detect and
prosecute tax cheats without first having sufficient information
about the taxpayer.202 FATCA's automatic information reporting
helps alleviate this problem by shifting the task, and,
conveniently, the cost, away from the IRS and on to the FFI.203
Furthermore, by engaging directly with FFIs who have
significant financial stakes in US markets, FATCA's required
waiver of any non-US law that would prohibit compliance
significantly helps enforcement, and has sent many countries to
the bargaining tables to sign IGAs.204
The imminent implementation of FATCA has spurred a
whirlwind of behavioral changes that have increased, and will
continue to increase, US tax compliance.205 With the threat of
FATCA looming, and through the multiple voluntary disclosure
programs, thousands are already flocking back to the US tax
system with the promise of amnesty. 206 Although far from
revolutionary, the US$5 billion recovered through voluntary
199. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (detailing how ineffective
TIEAs can be in practice).
200. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (explaining how Switzerland
nearly set up an impenetrable wall using the Swiss-DTA).
201. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (noting the effectiveness of
automatic versus request-based information exchange).
202. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (demonstrating this point
using TIEAs).
203. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (describing how the cost of
compliance is shifted to FFIs).
204. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (noting the waiver
requirement); supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (reporting the progress
made with IGAs).
205. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (describing a recent change
in behavior regarding tax compliance).
206. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (analyzing the effectiveness of
the voluntary disclosure programs).
2013] 1809
1810 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1767
disclosure is a positive step towards eliminating the tax gap.207
Moreover, as exemplified by the investigations into numerous
Swiss banks, the worldwide attitude towards tax evasion seems to
be changing in favor of compliance and disclosure.208
B. Why FATCA Comes Up Short
As a high-penalty, high-cost tax regime, FATCA does little
to solve the holdout problem inherent in any bilateral
agreement aimed at controlling tax arbitrage. 209 Tax arbitrage
will continue to exist so long as the costs of the arbitrage, i.e.
relocation of assets, do not outweigh the benefits, i.e. avoided
tax liability. 210 Any actor who determines that the costs of
compliance exceed the benefit of non-cooperation will exit the
FATCA scheme immediately. 211
There is reason to believe that many FFIs have such a large
financial stake in US securities that it would be financially
disastrous for them to exit that market. It would be wrong to
assume, however, that, under Professor Morse's framework,
compliant FFIs and nations are not close substitutes for their
noncompliant counterparts. 212 If it is true that many FFIs and
countries, particularly havens, are close substitutes for each
other, then FATCA's high-penalty regime would not deter the
penalized behavior in such a way that it would in the absence of
these substitutes. 213 The existence of these substitutes
perpetuates tax arbitrage as a rational and practicable option. 214
207. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (demonstrating how voluntary
disclosure can produce real results in the elimination of the federal tax gap).
208. See supra notes 113, 177-80 and accompanying text (reflecting this new
attitude with the DOJ investigations and recent IGAs).
209. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (illustrating the holdout problem
of bilateral agreements).
210. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (examining why tax arbitrage
takes place).
211. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (identifying total asset divestiture
as within contemplation).
212. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences
of the presence of close substitutes).
213. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (arguing that high-penalty
regimes cannot be successful without the absence of the option of substitution).
214. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the
existence of substitutes facilitates tax arbitrage).
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FATCA's automatic reporting requirements would certainly
provide the IRS with a treasure trove of tax information, but its
onerous compliance costs might incentivize both FFIs and
nations to hold out and reap the benefit of other players'
cooperation. 215 In bilateral agreements, such as a FATCA, FFI
Agreement, or an IGA, the payoff of non-cooperation could
easily exceed the costs of cooperation. 216 Thus, as each FFI and
nation signs FATCA agreements and IGAs, it becomes
increasingly beneficial for other FFIs and nations not to sign
these agreements so as to enjoy the benefits of increased tax
revenue from newly-relocated assets.217 So long as the cost of
compliance remains high and other options remain available,
the current FATCA model cannot overcome this incentive for
non-cooperation. 218
Faced with the incentive to holdout, FATCA may actually
do more harm than good to the United States. Capital flight
towards non-cooperative FFIs and countries would likely have an
adverse effect on US capital markets. 219 Tax evaders would be
responsible for a substantial part of this capital flight by
relocating their assets to non-FATCA jurisdictions.220 For smaller
FFIs, however, on the cusp of deciding whether to comply,
withhold, or divest, asset divestiture would similarly result in
capital flight.221 As is evidenced by China's recent stance on
signing a FATCA IGA, there is a strong reason to believe that
Asia is prime location for capital inflow. 222 Hong Kong
215. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (describing the holdout
incentive).
216. See supra notes 157-58 (applying the holdout incentive to bilateral
agreements).
217. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (illustrating the payoffs of
non-cooperation).
218. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (analyzing the holdout
problem in a tax arbitrage context); see also supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text
(examining the cost consequence of FATCA).
219. See supra note 146 (noting that the success of FATCA would depend on the
"stickiness" of US capital markets).
220. See supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text (describing the likelihood of
capital flight as a result of FATCA).
221. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (detailing the possibility of total
asset divestiture in response to FATCA).
222. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (outlining China's stance on
FATCA, and noting that the Asia Pacific region is heavily influenced by the policy
decisions of China).
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represents the exact type of close substitute that has very little
reason to comply with FATCA and every incentive to reap the
benefits of non-cooperation. 223
C. How to Achieve Information Symmetry
The US Congress enacted FATCA amid significant popular
animosity towards financial institutions perceived as helping US
citizens evade taxes, as well as toward havens facilitating this
evasion. The history surrounding its enactment notwithstanding,
the crucial question that remains is whether FATCA was indeed
the right solution. FACTA has caused a significant backlash from
FFIs and nations that see it as an imposition of imperious US tax
policy. As a result, it may ultimately do little to achieve its stated
goal of raising revenue to close the tax gap.224 Further, FATCA
would not reduce the present information asymmetry if
taxpayers and FFIs simply shifted their assets out of the United
States, and, more importantly, outside of United States'
jurisdiction.225
FATCA's purposes would be better accomplished if it were
replaced with a tax flight treaty.226 Tax flight treaties reverse the
incentive to holdout from bilateral agreements by establishing a
prize for which to compete.227 The prize here would be some
percentage of the assets of the US tax cheats that tax flight treaty
compliant nations voluntarily hand over to the IRS. 228 Under
this approach, the longer a nation waits before entering into the
agreement, the less likely it is that there will be US taxpayers to
divulge, and the less likely it would be to win an enviable
prize. 229 Unlike the FATCA method, the havens with the most
223. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (outlining China's stance on
FATCA).
224. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text (discussing some of the
global effects of FATCA).
225. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text (illustrating withdrawal from
US markets).
226. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text (arguing that tax flight
treaties can reverse the holdout incentive in bilateral agreements).
227. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (explaining how tax flight
treaties establish a prize to induce compliance).
228. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text (detailing how the lottery
system of tax flight treaties operate).
229. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (illustrating how tax flight
treaties reverse holdouts).
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assets held by US tax evaders have the most incentive to
cooperate.230 Thus, the United States could pay its way into the
market for tax information and benefit from competition
between nations for compliance without driving investment and
information away from the United States. 231
CONCLUSION
Tax evasion is a global problem that requires global
cooperation. The current tax treaty models, however, have
proven incapable of incentivizing multilateral cooperation to
tackle the issue. While the United States has spearheaded a
resolution through the enactment of FATCA, pursuing a FATCA
regime is not in the nation's best interest and is not a viable
solution.
Taxpayers and investors who weigh the costs and benefits of
any market transaction will come to realize that participating in
a FATCA agreement is uneconomical and shift their assets to
lower tax-liability jurisdictions. Similarly, governments presented
with the option to sign an IGA should think twice about signing
such an agreement, or risk forfeiting the potential to acquire
new, inbound capital. While this asset relocation could be
overcome through the cooperation of every single nation, there
is no incentive to cooperate if non-cooperation ensures a higher
payout. Thus, so long as close substitutes are a viable possibility
for any market transaction, which there almost certainly are, a
high-penalty regime like FATCA will remain ineffectual. The
United States should adopt a tax flight treaty. Tax flight treaties
could force traditional havens to cooperate, and would have the
effect of increasing taxpayer compliance, both voluntarily and
involuntarily, by reducing extraterritorial tax information
asymmetry. Unlike FATCA, these treaties could permanently rid
the United States of tax evaders.
230. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text (showing how the incentive
to cooperate increases along with the amount of tax evaders' assets held by the
country).
231. See supra notes 161-65 (overcoming the incentive to engage in tax
arbitrage).
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